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Loan Restructures
Lessons from the American Debt Crisis
Principles, Practical Issues and Strategies
Gerald Nels Olson'
I. Introduction.
In the twenty-two years following the abandonment of the Bretton Woods Accord by
the United States, fueled by rapid technological development and increasingly interdepen-
dent world trade, a global financial economy has been unleashed. The global financial
economy is approximately fifty times larger than the so-called global real economy.2
According to Joel Kurtzman, Executive Editor of the Harvard Business Review, "[t]he
ascendancy of trading means that finance has shifted its orientation from "investing" to one
of "transacting:' a consequence of the ability of computers and telecommunications net-
work to manipulate vast quantities of information effortlessly and send it around the world.
The information age has moved finance from its age-old static - even passive -
framework of buying assets or making investments and holding them, into something
new, making money by harvesting minute shifts in value across various exchanges!' 3
The growing dominance of the global financial economy, combined with the floating
rate currency exchange system which followed the collapse of Bretton Woods, and accom-
panied by the accelerated velocity of high-tech trading, has resulted in increasingly volatile
financial markets; highs are higher; lows are lower; and cycles are closer together as a result
of "hot money" and electronic "portfolio investment.' All of these developments have put
tremendous pressure on the international monetary system.
Unless the increasingly destabilising and volatile effects of the global financial econo-
my on the financial arrangements integral to domestic real economies are mitigated
through international currency stabilization and trading regulation, the pernicious prob-
lems presented in resolving insolvencies, liquidations, reorganizations and effecting debt
restructures will increase.
1. * Visiting Senior Fellow, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield
College, University of London; Associate Director, London Institute of International Banking,
Finance and Development Law. The author is currently writing an extended monograph
regarding distressed banks, law and public policy. The author is most grateful to his former
colleagues at Winstead, Sechies & Minick P.O., who participated in the preparation of prior
unpublished versions of certain materials contained in this paper.
2. Joel Kurtzman, The Death of Money: How the Electronic Economy has Destabilized the World's
Markets and Created Financial Chaos, at 12 (1993).
3. Id., at p. 25.
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The United States has benefitted, and expects to continue to benefit, from the abandon-
ment of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system through the devaluation of its inter-
national financial obligations. Because the dollar has continued to serve as the world's
reserve currency, currency stabilization through the adoption of a fixed or semi-fixed
exchange rate system is viewed as highly unlikely. Similarly, no nation or group of nations
has been willing to take the lead in regulating trading in the global financial economy.
Consequently, as pressures from the growing global financial economy increase, the world
may expect an increasing incidence of company and bank insolvencies and increasing size
and complexity of those insolvencies. Emerging economies are facing the brunt of this pres-
sure. As an example, following the collapse of the Mexican peso in late December 1994, non-
performing loans in Mexican banks rose from a 1994 rate of 9% of all bank loans to a 1995
rate of approximately 17%. Under U.S. accounting standards, however, the 17% rate would
equate to about 27%. 4 A bank bailout program is ongoing, with the non-performing loan
largely in the hands of banks. By the year ending March 1995, 14 Venezuelan banks had col-
lapsed. The government has not yet developed a plan to sell off banking assets that have fall-
en under state control as a result of interventions. 5 According to the International Monetary
Fund, "Crises in the banking systems of Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela and costly bank
bailouts in Brazil, have raised concerns that weak financial systems may be one of the most
important Achilles heel of the region's economic reforms."6
This paper examines the practical and legal issues addressed in the American banking
crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, at the point where the author's experience inter-
sected with an awareness of the extraordinary systemic nature of the collapse of asset val-
ues, and thus debtor and bank capital, in America in the mid 1980's.
According to Congressional testimony by Bernard Weinstein, Director of the Center
for Economics Development and Research, "... Mexico's current financial emergency mir-
rors Texas' and then the America's S & L crisis of a decade ago. An inadequate capital base,
rising loan losses, inexperienced management and a sky-high cost-of-funds all sound
familiar."7 Despite cultural and legal differences among the Latin American countries,
including Mexico and the United States, the causes of these financial crisis are essentially
the same. The issues presented in their resolution at the bank asset level through loan
restructures also are essentially the same. Indeed, "[the deflation visible in Mexico is part
of a larger, global asset and revenue collapse that is apparent in Japan, China, Europe and
in many emerging markets."8
In the United States, the deflating erosion of asset values was reflected first in debtors'
capital. As loan defaults proliferated, both debtors and creditors sought to protect their
balance sheets by shifting apparent losses to others through broad-based, multiparty nego-
4. U.S. GAO Report on Mexico's Financial Crisis, February 23, 1996, at p. 21.
5. Id., see also, R. Karoglan and M. Lubrano, Mexico's Banks After the December 1994 Devaluation
-A Chronology of the Governments Response, 16 N.W. J. OF INT'L. L. & Bus. 24 (1995).
6. Stephen Fidler, IMF to do more in Monitoring Banking FIN.TIMEs, March 26,1996, at p. 4.
7. Testimony of B. Weinstein, Director, Center for Economic Development and Research,
Professor of Applied Economics, University of North Texas, before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Congress, May 24,1995.
8. Testimony of C. Whalen, Chief Financial Officer, Legal Research International, Inc., before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Congress, May 24, 1995.
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tiations of consensual workouts, foreclosures, litigation and bankruptcy, followed by wide-
spread bank failures, rescues and bailouts. This process is distinguished from the legal and
economic effects of prior boom and bust cycles, following the Great Depression in the late
1920's and 1930's and in the mid 1970's in America and worldwide. It has been said that
the earlier cycles resulted in a winnowing of the weaker and less capable debtors and cred-
itors, whose misfortune was often predicated by mismanagement, and in some cases,
fraud. The recent systemic crisis of capital adequacy, however, struck both the strong and
the weak, and was thus devastating in its effect.
The more astute participants changed tactics in these new circumstances. These
changes were reflected by both debtor and creditor desires to resolve widespread defaults
in credit transactions on a "global:' "planned" or "integrated" basis, as opposed to narrow
enforcement of contractual and legal rights and remedies. There was, in effect, a tacit
acceptance by the more sophisticated players that the broad based economic.crisis was well
beyond the consequences of occasional mismanagement or fraud. Less astute participants
in this growing drama, most particularly politicians and bank regulators, however, contin-
ued to view the growing number of loan defaults as a moral crisis, founded in widespread
fraud and criminal activities. Tragically, the American legal and bank regulatory system
has been largely limited to this perspective. 9
This paper explores the dichotomy, first by examining the immediate context of the
American crisis of capital inadequacy during the period 1985 to 1995, then the distinctive
characteristics of the loss recognition and allocation processes between debtors and credi-
tors which brought the systemic nature of the American crisis to light, and which is, in the
most basic sense, the battle ground for debtor and creditor solvency.
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, debtors and creditors in the United States were in
the grip of a systemic cycle of capital deterioration of unprecedented proportion.
Superficial public and governmental opinion suggested that the current problem of capital
deterioration was driven by collapsing real estate values, first in the Southwest, and then in
New England, the Mid-Atlantic States and the Southeast, but that the problem did not
extend to other parts of the country. The problem of collapsing real estate values, however,
was pervasive throughout the United States. The effects of collapsing real estate values,
when combined with other problems with national implications (including increasing
9. But see, C. Whalen, who observes that "... the criminal economy ... [is] by far the largest of the
three sectors of the Mexican economy, which is built around narcotics trafficking, arms smug-
gling, kidnapping and other forms of illegal activity. The criminal economy has mushroomed
in size over the past decade and now clearly dominates the entire political economy of Mexico.
By way of comparison, consider that the $25 to $30 billion in profits from the $100 billion per
year narcotics trade is twice the total revenues of mexican oil sector ....
It is impossible to have sound solvent banks in an economic environment that is as hostile and
difficult is the one that I have just described." Id., citing an FBI report by James Moody, head of
that agency's narcotics section, Whalen notes that "companies in the process of privatization in
Mexico under President Salinas were purchased by narcotics trafficking organizations in
Mexico and Columbia' Id.
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rates of default on LBO's, junk bonds and other highly leveraged transactions) and region-
al economic problems, such as the oil and gas problems in the Southwest and sagging per-
formance by the so-called "high tech" industry in the Northeast, precipitated broad-based
credit constriction and an alarming rate of business failures, resulting in the erosion of the
nation's financial institutions' capital footings. This process has often been described as
the "deleveraging" of American business in the 1990's.
Experience revealed recurring patterns of reaction to this crisis by both debtors and
creditors. These reactions were marked by early and persistent denial of the problem.
Experience has also showed that, when regulatory examiners of federally-regulated financial
institutions forced recognition of the problem, both debtor and creditor management were
thrown into an intractable reactionary mode. Debtors faced abrupt and precipitous termi-
nation of long-standing, historical credit relationships. Creditors were often unable to with-
stand against the pressure of constantly increasing and restrictive regulatory action, includ-
ing the effect of regulators' actions on their operations, the constant turmoil of resulting cri-
sis management, the distortion on the institution's balance sheet caused by a dramatic shift
from earning to nonearning assets, increased levels of other real estate owned ("OREO") and
other repossessed collateral and the wave of litigation and bankruptcies which the reposses-
sion and foreclosure process invited, as the debtor's ticket to survival.10
The cycle of industry-wide in-substance and actual foreclosure or repossession, of col-
lateral marking to market of collateral value mandated by accounting and regulatory poli-
cy, increasing costs to carry and manage assets and to administer problems which the cred-
itors were inadequately prepared to manage and resolve, and the dramatic effect of nega-
tive leverage on both debtors and creditors, resulted in recurring unavoidable capital loss-
es, unless a proactive approach was taken by debtor and creditor management early in the
cycle. The mission of management was to minimize capital loss, stabilize the downward
spiral of negative leverage and deflect as much loss as possible to hapless, unprepared com-
petitors. Failure to act quickly, decisively and proactively, pursuant to a clear plan and
10. See Whalen's observations with respect to the developing situation in Mexico and Latin
America. Id. See also, Credit Crunch, the Banking Disaster in Mexico Whipsaws an Ailing
Economy, W.S.J., January 25, 1996, at p. A-1. Moreover, Mexican banks have been reluctant to
recognize the extent of their losses.... "Banks prefer to wait for the economy," with the hope
that growth will lift the prices of these properties again, says Pedro Azcue, managing partner at
La Salle [La Salle partners].
Mexican business culture contributes, too, to the unwillingness of bank to acknowledge their
mistakes and make changes. Short of a government takeover, few Mexican banks have made a
major management change, though many executive teams left their banks vulnerable.
Mexican boards tend not to hold managers as accountable as U.S. companies do, especially
because many Mexican companies are still dominated by families.'
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established priorities, resulted in the dissipation of both the debtor's and the creditor's liq-
uidity and capital and in the elimination of their remaining flexibility. This process of loan
workout and restructure was distinct from the usual loan-by-loan enforcement tactics gen-
erally employed in previous cycles.'1
This article examines the context for the American national crisis of capital adequacy,
describes in more detail the indicia of the problem and prescribes a proactive general pro-
gram to minimize the effect of this crisis on a given debtor or creditor by early problem
recognition; prompt, detailed and anticipatory response, accurate asset valuation, early loss
allocation and consensual balance sheet restructuring. The goal of both the debtor and the
creditor should be to recognize this problem early, deal with it in at least as favorable a
manner as the debtor's creditors and the bankruptcy courts ultimately would require, and
take painful but acceptable losses necessary to ensure the financial survival of both debtor
and creditor.12 As we will discover, there are many more restraints on the debtors' and
creditors' ability to act in their mutual best interest than initially meets the eye.
11. See, M. Tangman, "The Once, and Future, Banking Crisis?", Institutional Investors, at p. 19,
November 1995. "Mexicans' debt bind, with its potential for sparking social unrest, so worries
the government that in late August Zedillo and Ortiz presented an emergency four-point plan
to restructure bank loans. It was dearly aimed at stemming a growing tide of borrower senti-
ment for a payments moratorium, an idea first championed by rural debtors' organization El
Barzon on 1993. The borrowers' movement has gone urban and consumerist since interest
rates soared to more than 140 percent on credit card accounts during the first quarter this
year. The number of debtors' associations nationwide is now estimated at 100.
Threatened with a debt moratorium, bankers and government officials were adamant that
loan restructuring on a case-by-case basis was the only acceptable alternative. Says Elizabeth
Barrera, banking analyst with Interacciones Casa de Bolsa: "If you get borrowers to agree to
that, you weaken the promoratorium movement. But if you can't, you could get to a very dan-
gerous situation."
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12. Although loan restructures are an important component of resolution of the current Mexican
banking crisis, there remain many difficulties in the process. See, C. Torres, "Out of the loop,
Mexican Restructuring of Firms' Debt Often Hurts Foreign Holders" W.S.J., May 13, 1996 at p.
A- 1" "Because Mexico's creaky legal system is ill-equipped to handle complex bankruptcy cases,
many decisions are made by a clubby group of Mexican bankers and businessmen. Left out of
the loop - and in some cases, out of the money - are the foreign bondholders who bought more
than $20 billion of high-yield Mexican corporate debt in the early 1990's.
"There was a lot of greed and blind trust in a system that was fundamentally different' from that
in the U.S.," says Mitchell Sahn, a partner at Latin Tactical Trading Group Ltd., a New York
investment firm. "Investors have clearly had a wake-up call.'
A Different Debt Crisis Mexico's current debt crisis, stemming from its 1994 peso devaluation
and subsequent recession, contrasts sharply with the one in the early 1980's. Then, most foreign
debt owned by the Mexican government and corporations was in the form of loans from a man-
ageable number of international banks. By presenting a united front, they extracted favorable
restructuring terms. But now, most Mexican borrowings are inbonds, and the foreignholders
are a diverse and fractious lot, ranging from pension plans and mutual funds to wealthy individ-
uals scattered around the world. Nearly all were caught flat-footed by the recession, and few are
sufficiently organized to form bondholder groups and negotiate with the Mexican companies.
The Mexican government itself has managed to stay current on its roughly $90 billion bailout
arranged early last year by the U.S. government and the International Monetary Fund.
Corporate Problems Corporations are another story. Mexico's slow recovery from the reces-
sion has left many of them strapped for cash, and international markets are in most cases loath
to refinance their maturing debts. Investment bankers estimate at least a dozen companies
with some $3 billion in foreign bonds outstanding have already started restructuring their
debts or will do so later this year. Corporate blowups, though painful, are typically viewed by
bondholders as a cost of doing business with high-risk, high-yield issuers. But what happens
in the aftermath here is causing serious concern. Debt negotiations are always a rough busi-
ness in which secured creditors - those with the strongest guarantees -win the choice cuts of a
company's value; unsecured creditors get the scraps. But in the U.S. bankruptcy procedures
are well-defined, and even out-of-court settlements follow an orderly process. No so in
Mexico."An out-of-court restructuring in the U.S. usually incorporates the concerns of all
creditors," says Agustin Berdeja, managing partner of Berdeja & Associados, a law firm hiere.
"The lack of a specific legal framework for out-of-court restructures in Mexico sometimes
results in some creditors being treated more advantageously than others." As a substitute for
law, the Mexican government has approved an unusual new office in Mexico City to negotiate
out-of-court debt settlements. In charge is Eduardo Robinson Bours, a young poultry baron
who helped negotiate some of the North American Free Trade Agreement's agricultural
accords for Mexico. He has become, in essence, Mexico's one-man bankruptcy system. He
says he was chosen because his government, banking and business contracts allow him to
'knock on all three doors' with ease. Mr. Bours says he has no governmental authority. But sit-
ting near his desk is a big red phone, a hot line linking him with government ministers and
President Ernest Zedillo. Mr. Bours's office is just a few steps away from the National Banking
Commission, the bank regulatory agency. His expenses are paid by the government's bank-
bailout fund.
Shaky Banks Some investors suspect that Mr. Bours's real job is to keep Mexico's banking system
afloat. The banks were so badly damaged by the December 1994 devaluation that last year they
had to ask their shareholders for more than $1 billion in new cash. Now, the weakened banks
can't afford to have their clients, the debt-swamped corporations, fall." See also, D. Darrow, et
al., "Restructuring Strategies for Mexican Eurobond Debt," 16 NW.J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 117
(1995).
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II. Immediate Legal and Economic Context.
The apparent roots of the United States' capital adequacy crisis were found in the late
1970's. This period was characterized by the following factors:
1. high inflation in all goods and services;
2. an abrupt increase in interest rates, with prime exceeding 20 percent;
3. an oil crisis that made marginal production profitable;
4. resultant heavy investment in real estate and energy as inflation hedges; and
5. severe problems experienced by financial institutions, particularly thrifts, arising from:
a. Significant undercapitalization and overleverage. While the early 1970's had been a
period of growth, the U.S. Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"), during
these relatively "good times," consistently reduced capital requirements, rather than
holding the line in requiring a relatively high ratio of capital to liabilities. This
retreat was made during a time when the thrifts had sufficient earnings to develop
an adequate capital base;
b. Limitations imposed by law with respect to the rates banks and thrifts could pay for
small deposits. Unregulated financial institutions were not so limited.
Disintermediation was the logical result, as small depositors sought to minimize the
ravages of high inflation by taking advantage of the rates offered by money market
funds and cash management accounts;
c. Banks and thrifts being forced to replace the small depositors with large certificates
of deposit at competitive rates. This had a particularly devastating effect on thrifts
whose assets consisted primarily of lower fixed-rate residential mortgages. The
resulting negative spread caused thrifts to lose capital at an alarming rate.
These factors led to a series of reactionary events in the early 1980's, which resulted in
a "finance/tax push" on real estate values. First, Congress passed the Depositary
Institutions Deregulation & Monetary Control Act of 1980 ("DIDIMCA"), 13 under which
three major actions were taken. First, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") deposit insurance was
increased to $100,000 from $40,000.14 Next, the liability side of the balance sheet for
banks and savings and loans was deregulated. Banks and savings associations could now
13. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). § 202 indicates that DIDIMCA was promulgated as an
attempt at an orderly phase-out and, ultimately, an elimination of limitations on the maxi-
mum rates of interest and dividends which could be paid on deposits and accounts by deposi-
tory institutions. Congress determined that all depositors were entitled to receive a market
rate of return on their savings as soon as it was economically feasible for depository institu-
tions to pay such a rate. 12 U.S.C. §3501 (1996).
14. DIDIMCA § 308(a)(1)(A).
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pay competitive rates for deposits without restriction. 15 Finally, federal laws were adopted,
pursuant to which state usury laws were preempted, to provide for unlimited interest rates
on first lien loans on residential property (houses, condominiums, apartments, townhous-
es) 16 and interest rates (on business and agricultural loans of $25,000 or more) that could
equal five percent above the discount rate at the Fed window.17 (At this time, rates were
still at an historical high and the Fed discount rate exceeded 14 to 15 percent) These pro-
visions allowed deposits to be brokered in fully insured $100,000 increments,18 with rates
on deposits at whatever level was needed to attract the deposit 19 and investment of
deposits at rates exceeding state usury laws.20 DIDIMCA superficially may have alleviated
the disintermediation problem, but it did not stop the huge losses of the thrifts which were
still carrying lower fixed-rate assets.
Meanwhile, inflation in real estate prices continued, even as the general inflation rate
abated. Real property inflation was fueled by the tax shelter business, which received a
large push from the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA"). 2 1 ERTA improved tax
shelter opportunities in real estate principally by reducing the depreciable life of improve-
ments to 15 years from 35 years. 22 In addition to this new incentive, investors already
could deduct investment interest paid or accrued, and could take advantage of nonre-
course mortgage financing for purposes of deducting losses.23 If the property were held
for longer than one year, it was entitled to the 60 percent long-term capital gains
exclusion, 24 thus insuring a maximum tax of 20 percent on disposition (in 1984, the hold-
ing period was shortened to six months).25 Before long, limited partnerships or syndica-
15. Id at § 204. Authority to control the rates paid on deposits by depository institutions under
Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823 (1966) was provided for a term of six years from the date of
enactment of the legislation in order to give thrift institutions time to incorporate the new pow-
ers granted to them so that they might increase their earnings and be in a position to attract
deposits by paying market interest rates. The Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC and the FHLBB,
however, were permitted to regulate depository institutions' advertising of interest rates. 12
U.S.C. §1735f-7a (1996).
16. DIDIMCA § 501. States were permitted to override the federal preemption of state usury lim-
its on home mortgage loans within the period after April 1, 1980, and prior to April 1, 1983.
The override could consist of the adoption of a law or a vote by voters in favor of any provi-
sion, constitutional or otherwise, which stated explicitly that the state did not want the federal
preemption to apply to loans made in that state.
17. DIDIMCA § 511.
18. -d. at § 308(a)(1)(A).
19. Id at § 204.
20. Id. at §§ 501,511.
21. Pub L. No. 97-34,95 Stat. 172 (1981). § 212 of ERTA amended §§ 46 and 48 of the I.R.C. and
increased the investment tax credit for rehabilitation expenditures to 15 percent for nonresi-
dential 30-year old buildings, 20 percent for nonresidential 40-year old buildings; 25 percent
credit for residential and nonresidential certified historic structures; and repealed the acceler-
ated cost recovery and demolition disincentives for certified historic structures.
22. ERTA § 201; I.R.C. § 168 (the recovery period was subsequently extended to 18 years by the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and then to 19 years in 1985). The taxpayer was given the
option to elect to use the straight-line depreciation method over 15 years, 35 years or 45 years
for 15-year public utility property.
23. I.R.C. § 163.
24. I.R.C. § 1202(a).
25. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,98 Stat. 494 (1984), § 1001(a)(1).
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tions became an attractive way to invest in real estate because they generated tax savings
and profits that passed through to investors. Broader participation in the apparently high-
ly profitable real estate business was seen as a panacea for the thrifts.
Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 ("Garn-St.
Germain"). 26 Garn-St. Germain allowed thrifts to expand their lending powers by allow-
ing commercial and nonresidential real estate lending27 (so-called acquisition, develop-
ment and construction loans, as well as commercial loans28), make direct investments in
real estate29 (state-chartered institutions in some jurisdictions already enjoyed broad
investment authority), participate in ownership of real estate through joint ventures, part-
nerships and similar vehides,30 eliminate loan-to-value ratios for residential mortgages31
and, in some instances, utilize loan-to-value ratios up to 100 percent.32 The result was that
a savings and loan charter was more flexible than a bank charter.
Entrepreneurs were encouraged to acquire savings and loans and operate them as
giant real estate companies. State laws were amended, giving state savings and loans
expanded powers. California, Florida and Texas were examples. California allowed 100
percent of an in-state thrift's assets to be contributed to a subsidiary service corporation
for investment activities. Texas allowed leverage of 20-to-1 on capital in service corpora-
tions. 33 Capital requirements of savings associations were dropped to three percent of lia-
bilities on a long-term averaging basis, as opposed to five percent.34 Banks' capital require-
ments remained at five and one-half percent primary and six percent secondary. Leverage
in the savings and loan industry was 33 times capital raised, and in the banking industry,
15 times capital raised.
Regulatory and examination forces of state and federal regulatory bodies were not
expanded to handle effectively the regulation of the broadened powers arising from
DIDIMCA and Garn-St. Germain. In addition to new powers, there was a quantifiable
risk increase as the amount of deposit insurance rose two and one-half times from $40,000
per account to $100,000. Incredibly, the FDIC system had ten times more personnel than
the FSLIC system. In the midst of all this change, the Federal Home Loan Bank ("FHLB")
of Little Rock, Arkansas, was moved to Dallas, Texas, causing significant loss of experi-
enced personnel. Then several events occurred:
26. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982). Federal savings associations were granted expanded
lending and investment authority by this Act, as an attempt to provide them with the flexibili-
ty necessary to maintain their role of providing credit for housing.
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(B).28. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(R).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(3).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(N).
31. 12 US.C. § 1464(c)(1)(B).
32. Id.
33. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 342-606 (Vernon 1973). This act was repealed by 69th Leg. R.S.
Ch. 639 § 21 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 237.
34. Texas Savings and Loan Department, 10 Tex. Reg. 3429 (1985) (codified at 7 Tex. Admin. Code
64.7(b)).
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• oil and gas prices dropped;
" Empire Savings of Texas failed;
* Continental Illinois Bank failed;
" Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma failed;
" certain instances of fraud, deceit and abuse appeared; and
" reactive re-regulation commenced.
These events precipitated the crisis which emerged first in the thrift industry and in
Texas banking and spread throughout the capital base of the nation's businesses and finan-
cial institutions. Reregulation of the financial institutions and elimination of tax incen-
tives for real estate removed the finance/tax push on real estate values and caused values to
shrink and capital to "evaporate" from our financial system. The crisis began slowly, but
quickly gathered momentum.
Beginning in 1984 and 1985, reregulation of the thrifts commenced in earnest.
Personnel in the FHLB of Dallas were shaken up, with tough regulators appointed to key
positions. New appraisal standards were adopted, 35 resulting in lower values and lower
comparables, and often were applied on a retroactive basis. New capital regulations were
adopted requiring more capital,36 when the aim should have been to preserve existing cap-
ital. New growth restriction regulations were adopted,37 and classification of asset regula-
tions were also adopted.38
All of these measures treated the emerging thrift crisis as one that could be cured sim-
ply by tightening the rules. However, these measures failed to take into account their effect
on the dynamics of the real estate industry and its interrelation with the value of assets
held by thrifts and banks. The upshot of the sudden change in the rules was that property
values depreciated quickly and insidiously in a downward spiral. The FHLBB's overreac-
tion led to:
35. These standards are currently located at C.F.R. § 563.17-la(c)(1). The Code sets forth three
appraisal standards that, at a minimum, must be included in the appraisal policies of every
insured institution and service corporation. First, the appraisal must be based upon the defin-
ition of market value as set forth in the regulation. This definition contemplates the consum-
mation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from buyer to seller under open
and competitive market conditions requisite to a fair sale. Second, the appraisal must be pre-
sented in a narrative format. The appraisal report must be sufficiently descriptive to enable a
reviewer to readily ascertain the estimated value reported and the rationale for that estimate.
The analysis is required to be as detailed and in depth as the complexity of the real estate
requires. Third, an appraisal must contain a sales history of the real estate appraised.
Generally, sales Within the three previous years must be disclosed.
36. 50 Fed. Reg. 6891 (1985) (codified at 12 CFR § 563.13 (1985)).
37. 12 C.F.R. § 563.98 (1990). This section established new restrictions for equity risk investments
by savings associations. The limits for investments were based on tangible capital in relation
to total liabilities. In addition, permissible investments were described and diversification was
required.
38. Fed. Home Loan Bank Board Memo. No. R41C; Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) §40.185.176.
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1. a precipitous decline in available financing by thrifts;
2. revised appraisal standards and nervous appraisers causing lower appraised values
that, by way of comparables, caused still further lowering of values;
3. existing capital evaporating from this loss of real property value;
4. incipient negative leverage;39 and
5. the loan portfolios of many of the financial institutions began to consist primarily of
term loans which were due to be paid in full at maturity.40
New tax legislation then took tax incentives out of property ownership, causing fur-
ther loss of real property value and hence financial institution capital.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA-86") 41 virtually eliminated tax as a consideration
in the purchase of real estate. The easy write-offs that once made otherwise marginal real
estate development profitable were gone.
Nineteen eighty-six was the last year that developers could take advantage of the faster
depreciation allowed under the old law. Under TRA-86, the depreciable life for real estate
improvements went from 19 years to 31- years.42 The "at risk" rules changed, limiting tax
write-offs to the amount actually invested.43 The deductibility of interest used to finance
investment property was limited to the amount of net investment income.44
Moreover, new "passive loss" rules required that losses from an activity in which an
individual did not materially participate could be deducted only from income derived
from a passive activity.45 Prior to these rules, an investor could deduct these losses from
any income, including salary.46
39. For each dollar of capital loss, thrifts were required to shrink assets $33 1/3, and banks $15.
Shrinkage was difficult, however, since the depreciating values meant that there were no buyers
or new financing available. When shrinkage did occur, it usually was from the sale of earning
assets, and the loss of income from those earning assets' further reduced capital, requiring still
more asset shrinkage. The consequence of this downward spiral is obvious.
40. Needless to say, the majority of these loans were not paid at maturity. As a result, the institu-
tions were deprived of a major source of asset shrinkage.
41. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (hereinafter "TRA'). The 60 percent deduction for
long-term capital gains were repealed; residential real estate was to be depreciated over 27 1/2
years under the straight-line method, nonresidential real estate was to be depreciated over 31
1/2 years under the straight-line method; the investment tax credit was repealed; the
Rehabilitation tax credit was substantially reduced; "at risk" rules now applied to real estate;
and losses from "passive activities" could be offset income from other passive activities.
42. TRA 1986 § 201. This section amended I.R.C. § 168.
43. TRA 1986 § 503. This section repealed I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D), which excluded the holding of
real property from the application of the "at risk" rules.
44. TRA 1986 § 511. This section amended I.R.C. § 163(d), such that after the Act was passed,
investment interest expense was only to be deducted against net investment income.
45. I.R.C. § 469.
46. I.R.C. § 165.
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The capital gains tax exclusion was repealed, 47 resulting in a maximum tax rate of 28
percent instead of 20 percent.48 Finally, the investment tax credit was eliminated 49 and the
rehabilitation credit substantially reduced.50
As a result of the initial finance/tax push in real estate values and the subsequent
removal of that finance/tax push, a spiraling depression in values occurred with losses in
value as high at 50 percent, rivaling the October 1987 stock market debacle. There was not
a shift of wealth; there was a loss of wealth. Operating losses become monumental. For
banks and thrifts, these were caused by:
1. loss of operating income:
a. no new loans being made since no growth is allowed (i.a, there is no capital to sup-
port any growth; to the contrary, shrinkage is required);
b. borrowers not paying interest, much less principal; and
c. income not being realized from collateral by reason of legal issues and lender liabili-
ty considerations;
2. increase in operating expenses:
a. increase in cost of funds, despite FDIC insurance (the so-called Texas premium);
b. legal fees running up to $500,000 per month at many thrifts;
c. consultant fees equal to that same amount being incurred per month;
d. property operating and management costs increasing with respect to OREO in non-
performing assets; and
e. hidden costs arising from constant regulator involvement, required independent
reappraisals and additional accounting and personnel expense;
3. delays in dealing with nonperforming loans caused by:
a. borrowers' lender liability lawsuits (sometimes successful), often brought to buy
time to deal with the adverse tax consequences of foreclosure;
b. injunctions and restraining orders limiting enforcement of creditors' rights against
security;
c. regulatory delays-most thrifts and many banks were under some type of regulatory
control or scrutiny; and
d. inter-creditor disagreements on participated loans.
The rush to real estate investment, inspired by previously favorable tax legislation and
fueled by the massive availability of capital for real estate investment provided by banks and
thrifts, created an enormous constituency of owners who, in the face of the loss of tax bene-
fits due to changes in the tax laws, were confronted with significant adverse tax conse-
47. TRA 1986 § 301. This section amended I.R.C. § 1202.
48. Id. at § 302(a)(1).
49. Id. at § 211.
50. Id. at § 251. The rehabilitation tax credit for certified historic structures was reduced from 25
percent to 20 percent, a credit of 10 percent was provided for substantial rehabilitation of
buildings placed in service before 1936, there was to be no credit for any buildings placed in-
service after 1935, that was not certified historic, and the credit was subject to the limitations
on passive losses and credits.
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quences on asset disposition. The problem of adverse tax consequences was exacerbated by
collapsing values and the resulting lack of resources from asset sale proceeds to pay the tax
bill. Owners generally could not sell for a price which would pay the tax bill for the phan-
tom gains from the disposition of property upon which the outstanding debt is in excess of
the owner's adjusted basis in the property, as reduced by depredation deductions, much less
provide for recovery of equity or the making of a profit. Just as importantly, the debtors
who owned the real estate could not permit foreclosure on the collateral by the creditors
since that would trigger the same tax problems for the debtor as a sale to a third party.
Financial institutions, which were under pressure to shrink, sought to enforce foreclosure
against the collateral, but generally paid no attention to the underlying systemic tax and
value problems which faced the debtor. This often resulted in costly and time consuming
litigation and bankruptcies initiated as protective action by debtors and designed, in most
cases, to delay and afford to the debtor some opportunity to shift the unrecognized losses
already in the system, including both tax losses and real losses of equity, to others.
In the late 1980's, in continuation of the quest for higher returns and fee income and,
based in part on the commercial acceptability of borrowing on the basis of expected cash
flow and anticipated asset dispositions as well as the introduction and market acceptance
of noninvestment grade corporate high yield debt, as an alternative to real estate financing
and equity investments, investors began to concentrate heavily in these highly leveraged
transactions ("HLTs"), such as leveraged buyouts. These HLTs afforded significant tax
incentives by allowing interest on corporate debt to be deducted, as distinguished from
nondeductible dividends on equity. The rise in HLTs corresponded to the general tenden-
cy of American businesses to leverage themselves to unprecedented levels. Debt service
required ever larger portions of debtor companies' cash flow. The decline of business rev-
enues due to regional economic woes and increases in interest rates eroded the liquidity
margin between success and default. Debtor companies with substantial amounts of float-
ing rate debt, zero coupon debt or short or medium-term debt that must be refinanced,
found that there was no practical alternative to a reorganization when faced with the
reduced flexibility of federally-insured financial institutions which could no longer freely
refinance these HLTs and when faced with a contracting market where the debtor could
not readily spinoff assets at acceptable prices. The real question in any reorganization
became how the cost of that deleveraging and loss recognition would be shared and how it
would be effected. 51
While the scenario described above was suffered primarily by thrifts and banks in
Texas, New England and the Mid-Atlantic states, it inevitably spread in varying degrees to
financial institutions in other regions. On December 19, 1989, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") issued a Fact Sheet, 52 in which it clearly set out its
51. See Cieri, An Introduction to Legal and Practical Considerations in the Restructuring of Troubled
Leveraged Buyouts, 45 Bus. LAW 333 (Nov. 1989) with respect to restructuring of HLTs.
52. Under the heading "Current and Future Actions,' the Fact Sheet states that the OCC is using
its experts in real estate lending problems to assist in reviewing targeted banks. The Fact Sheet
states that the purpose of this review is to help assess banks' vulnerability to softening real
estate markets and review real estate loan portfolios in banks with potential problems. The
Real Estate Valuation Model was to be used to identify those banks with potential problems or
weaknesses in targeted markets. The OCC stated that this model would be refined to fit the
characteristics of individual markets.
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intention to identify those banks which may be vulnerable to softening real estate markets
and to review those banks with potential problems. Those banks most likely to be subject
to an OCC target exam were those that had a large real estate loan portfolio, or were in a
market that the OCC macroeconomic model indicated as approaching an overbuilt condi-
tion. The Fact Sheet stated that "[i] f banks are not recognizing problem real estate loans,
examiners will ensure that they do so in the future.' 53
The intermediate term effect on these institutions was unpleasant, at best. Federal
banking regulations required that OREO be marked to market no less frequently than
annually.54 Actual practice of the OCC in a pervasively declining regional market was been
to require that banks anticipate future value declines by establishing "OREO valuation
reserves;' also a direct charge to capital, unlike the "loan loss reserve." As the real estate mar-
ket in a region dried up, comparable sales become so infrequent that they were deemed
meaningless by bank regulators. The Texas and New England experience showed that the
value of a bank's OREO portfolio was then determined by the judgment of regulators, using
discounted cash flow computer models and the regulators' assumptions, even when those
regulators were based in other parts of the nation and likely had no personal knowledge of
the regional market. This discounted cash technique was also used to value land, an
appraisal method not sanctioned by any professional appraisal body. The effect of OREO
write-downs and valuation reserves on banks' earnings and capital was devastating. These
same write-down and valuation practices were applied to other assets, including HLTs. The
impact of these events on the marketplace included general credit tightening and restrictive
requirements for additional collateral and equity support for businesses generally.
All of these developments received high profile attention as they affected U.S. financial
institutions. The deterioration of capital and the intransigence of U.S. financial institu-
tions in their battle for survival placed a premium on the peaceful and nondestructive allo-
cation of loss and the preservation of the base of businesses in the most efficient manner
possible. The goal of a debtor's nonjudicial workout is to provide for such an efficient and
equitable loss allocation with respect to that debtor, short of bankruptcy, and to preserve
its business as a valuable going concern.
III. Impact on Debtors.
In a collapsing economy, debtor companies tend to recognize and attack problem
assets or financing on an individual basis. This tendency is exacerbated when one or more
of the debtor's creditors, caught in the downward spiral of the systemic capital adequacy
crisis, behaves in a reactionary mode and focuses only on its own problems with the
debtor, disregarding the debtor's other credit relationships and problems. At some point,
the debtor may come to realize that it is unable to maintain many separate negotiations for
the resolution of its problems simultaneously on a coherent basis. The debtor will recog-
nize that many of its problems are interrelated and that some of its lenders or investors are
more aggressive in seeking collection and pursuing default remedies than others. The
debtor will have been prone to resolve its problems with its most troublesome creditors on
a preferential basis and to defer the resolution of problems or potential problems with its
more patient creditors, to their mutual detriment.
53. The Fact Sheet also stated that the OCC would require the targeted banks to take whatever cor-
rective action was necessary with respect to real estate lending practices and loan portfolios.
54. 12 C.F.R. § 7.3025 (1990).
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Each creditor considers its loan transaction and prospects for collection from a nar-
rowed perspective. As the debtor's financial condition deteriorates, each creditor seeks to
spread its grip over the debtor's resources to maximize its prospects for collection. When
the debtor seeks to respond to each creditor on an individual basis, and where each credi-
tor adopts its hegemony over the debtor's financial resources through cross-collateraliza-
tion, requirements of completion deposits, establishment of performance hurdles or dead-
lines which limit flexibility and distort decision making, the debtor may find that, in the
process, its financial resources are insufficient to meet the demands of all its creditors.
The formulation of an overall workout plan for a debtor in the environment of a sys-
temic capital adequacy crisis and the responses generated by its financial institution credi-
tors, requires a change of focus or frame of reference by the debtor, as well as its creditors.
Unless the debtor's efforts are coordinated properly and the work handled efficiently, the
debtor's efforts will become paralyzed and the expense undertaken in the preparation of a
consensual workout plan will be wasted. No overall workout plan can be accomplished
without successful individual workouts, through renegotiation of the affected loan or cred-
it transactions. Conversely, the only way in which the debtor can achieve a successful
workout is by placing these individual successful workout renegotiations in the context of
an overall plan, which is designed to maximize return to all of the creditors on a fair and
equitable basis and to motivate the debtor to follow through with the plan and ultimately
avoid judicial reorganization or liquidation. The plan must accommodate the financial
and legal positions inherent in each individual workout negotiation situation, and each
individual negotiation situation must be placed in the context of the overall workout plan.
In its initial stages, the plan is a reflection of a coherent communication of the debtor's
legal and financial condition. The effect of this broad-based communication to the credi-
tors of the debtor will have the effect of repositioning many of the debtor/creditor rela-
tionships from their status prior to presentation of the plan. This process of repositioning
generally will go through several stages in which the overall nature of the plan may shift
based upon shifting individual workout negotiations and individual negotiations will vary
in light of the economic implication of the plan upon the specific transaction and based
upon the legal implications of the relationship and of the plan itself. The objective of a
consensual reorganization is to obtain the essential benefits of protection afforded under
the federal bankruptcy laws without the attendant costs, stigma, and potential loss of con-
trol. The basic equitable principles underlying a successful consensual reorganization are
the same basic equitable principles that underlie the completion of a successful reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.55 A consensual reorganization, how-
ever, is not the legal equivalent of a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code. Any discus-
sion of reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code is beyond the scope of this paper.
55. See II U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
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IV. Consensual Workouts.
A. ADVANTAGES OF CONSENSUAL WORKOUTS FOR BOTH DEBTORS AND CREDITORS.
Consensual workouts fix the rights of the parties and avoid the uncertainties of litiga-
tion in bankruptcy. Other advantages afforded by consensual workouts, as opposed to
bankruptcy, include the following:
1. Consensual workouts are more flexible; workouts permit legitimate agreements to
accomplish the consensual intent of the parties, limited primarily by depth and
breadth of imagination;
2. Consensual workouts preserve higher asset values; debtors are given incentives to max-
imize recoveries to limit deficiency liability;
3. Consensual workouts are generally less expensive, both from an administrative per-
spective and from a legal perspective. Workouts limit costs and avoid burdens of liti-
gation and bankruptcy;
4. Consensual workouts often afford more benefits to creditors and debtors, both tangi-
ble and intangible:
a. management retains control of business;
b. debtor avoids "stigma" of bankruptcy;
c. debtor's principals may avoid or defer liability on personal guaranties;
d. creditor might obtain acknowledgment of outstanding indebtedness and of validity
of liens and encumbrances;
e. creditor might obtain waiver of defenses, setoffs and counterclaims;
f. creditor might obtain additional collateral and guaranties; and
g. creditor might correct deficiencies in loan or security documents.
B. DISADVANTAGES OF CONSENSUAL WORKOUTS FROM THE DEBTOR'S STANDPOINT.
Since a workout is a consensual arrangement, neither debtor nor cooperating creditors
can bind nonassenting creditors nor halt litigation or foreclosure proceedings by uncoop-
erative creditors. Substantial unanimity is required of all creditors. This unanimity is
often difficult to obtain.
Claims by governmental entities are frequently more difficult to deal with in workouts
because governmental or government-controlled creditors tend to be less flexible; their
respective regulatory guidelines frequently do not permit flexibility.
Additional problems include:
1. The debtor is unable to reject burdensome leases or other executory contracts;
2. The debtor is unable to recover property in possession of foreclosing creditors or to
defeat prior attachment, garnishment or levy;
3. The debtor is unable to recover preferential, fraudulent or voidable transfers that oth-
erwise might be avoidable in bankruptcy; and
4. The debtor has no convenient forum (such as an experienced bankruptcy court) for
expeditious resolution of disputes, enforcement of sales free and clear of liens and
encumbrances, determination of priority of liens and the like.
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C. DISADVANTAGES OF CONSENSUAL WORKOUTS FROM THE CREDITOR'S STANDPOINT.
Unlike bankruptcy, consensual workouts do not subject actions of the debtor and its
principals to judicial scrutiny and control. Participation in a consensual workout might
perpetuate ineffectual or dishonest management. It may also permit continued erosion of
collateral or other asset values if control of timing and price of liquidation remains with
the debtor. Participation in a consensual workout does not prevent a subsequent bank-
ruptcy filing if the workout fails.
D. CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONSENSUAL WORKOUT.
Participation in a consensual workout makes no sense if the crucial components of a
successful workout are not present. Those elements depend upon the attributes of the par-
ticular workout. For example, inability to survive in the long term is inconsequential if the
workout contemplates an orderly liquidation of assets, as opposed to continuing business
operations. Many consensual workouts initially envision long-term survival, but as negoti-
ations progress, they evolve into more or less of an orderly liquidation. In evaluating a
proposed consensual workout, some of the most important factors relating to its potential
success include:
1. adequate liquidity (cash) available to fund the workout;
2. readjusted and realistic expectations by all parties;
3. adequate disclosure of information; a consensual workout is, in a sense, a private
bankruptcy proceeding, where the scope of information provided by debtor should be
substantially equivalent to that disclosed in a formal bankruptcy filing,
4. flexibility of the legal rights and practical leverage of each of the participants;
5. appreciation of the legal rights and practical leverage of each of the participants;
6. absence of significant avoidable transfers which prefer one creditor over others in the
same class, as well as equal treatment of classes of creditors;
7. perceived fairness in the treatment of differing creditor and equity classes;
8. continuing cooperation of critical creditors, employees and management personnel;
9. confidence in management;
10. confidence in the debtor's business plan; and
11. ability to operate profitably within the applicable regulatory climate.
E. PITFALLS WHICH CREDITORS SHOULD SEEK To AVOID IN A CONSENSUAL WORKOUT.
Assuming that the key elements for a successful consensual workout are present, credi-
tors should guard against:
1. inducing others to extend credit to the debtor;
2. paying debtor's employees without making adequate provisions for trust fund taxes or
funding the payroll with knowledge that debtor's management will not surrender or
withhold appropriate taxes;
3. failing to comply with bulk transfer provisions;
4. failing to take immediate possession of surrendered collateral;
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5. becoming enmeshed in unintended admissions, waivers or releases during negotia-
tions; and
6. exercising control over the debtor.
V. Evolution of Insolvency Law as a Context for Consensual Workouts.
Awareness of the evolution of insolvency law brings context to current national, as well
as international, problems of insolvency. Historically, the United States has addressed the
problem of insolvency through its bankruptcy laws. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was the
first bankruptcy law adopted by the United States Congress.56 The Bankruptcy Act of
i800 closely followed the English Statute of Bankrupts.57 In turn, the origins of the
English Statute of Bankrupts may be traced back to the laws of other European countries,
the Italian city-states of the 14th Century, and even further to the Roman Empire.58
The various practices employed in dealing with the problem of a debtor who either
refused, or was unable, to pay its debts date back as far as the extension of credit itself. In
the primitive and ancient cultures, public opinion provided two sanctions by which a
debtor could be compelled to perform his part of a contract. Each of these sanctions was
extremely powerful. One sanction was religious, while the other was more primitive and
severe: Execution. 59
56. Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, Bankrupty, 20 (1985) (Univ. Casebook Series 1985).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 17. On ancient Roman collection practices, "If the debtor be insolvent to serve creditors,
let his body be cut in pieces on the third market day. It may be cut into more or fewer pieces
with impunity, or, if his creditors consent to it, let him be sold to foreigners beyond the Tiber7
Twelve Tables, Table 111, 6 (c. 450 B.C.).
59. Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 223, 229 (1918). For instance,
in India of old, and currently in Nepal, creditors engaged in the practice of "sitting d'harna"
and, in ancient Ireland, creditors engaged in "fasting on" debtors. These practices involved the
creditor placing himself before the debtor's doorway and remaining until the debt was paid.
This practice was extremely effective, in light of the fact that debtor would have been instantly
and severely punished by public opinion if he were to permit his creditor to suffer from exhaus-
tion or die of starvation at his door. Id. at 229, citing Tarde, "Evolution of Procedure," in
Primitive andAncient Legal Institutions 700 (A. Kocourek & J. Wigmore eds. 1915). The Hindus
employed a system of self help. In this system, the creditor could take his debtor and force him
to perform labor for him or he could resort to violence and kill or maim the debtor, confine his
wife, his sons or his cattle. Lang, "Origin of Exogamy and Totemism,' in Primitive and Ancient
Legal Institutions 230 (A. Kocourek & J. Wigmore eds. 1915), citing Manu. XIII, 48 ff.
The Egyptians, however, only provided for the attachment of the debtor's property, not his
person. The rationale for this was that the state might at any time require the debtor's service,
in peace as an official or laborer, and in war as a soldier. Id., at 230-31, on the authority of
Diodorous, I, 79; Reveillout, Cours de Droit Egyptien, at 42. In time, legal process against
insolvents evolved to the point where execution was had against the property of the debtor,
rather than against the debtor himself. Undoubtedly, this was the result of a change in objec-
tive from retaliation to compensation. Tarde, at 232. In ancient systems of law, whether the
debtor was actually honest or dishonest, insolvency was seen as something that was irregular
and fraudulent. However, in time the unfortunate insolvent was distinguished from the fraud-
ulent bankrupt. See, e.g., Code of Hammurabi, §§ 116, 117, where protection from creditors
was provided to the debtor who was made insolvent by misfortune.
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In 13th Century England, the common law provided for imprisonment of the debtor
until he "made agreement (with his creditors) or his friends for him.'60 Imprisonment was
intended to compel payment of the debt and not to punish the debtor for his failure to pay.61
The most important early English bankruptcy law was the Statute of Bankrupts.62
The Statute of Bankrupts was directed toward punishment of fraudulent debtors63 and
only applied to debtors who were merchants, providing that a debtor who committed "an
act of bankruptcy"64 was to be reputed, deemed and taken for a bankrupt. Upon com-
plaint, the Lord Chancellor could appoint a commission of "wise, honest and discrete" per-
sons who were authorized to seize the property of the bankrupt and sell it for the payment,
pro rata, of the debts of the bankrupt. The bankrupt, however, remained liable to the
extent that his creditors were not paid in full. The commissioners had the power to
imprison the bankrupt and, by virtue of a later statute, could be subject to pillory and the
loss of an ear as well. 65 The design of early English bankruptcy law was to protect credi-
tors and to punish debtors who were trying to avoid payment of just debt.66
In the early 18th Century, the harshness with which bankrupts were treated was greatly
reduced by statutes which provided for the granting of a discharge to the bankrupt of the
debts owing at the time of bankruptcy.67 This development was attributed to the notion
that bankrupts were not always fraudulent, and sometimes failed because of circumstances
beyond their control; such bankrupts were entitled to relief.68 Society recognized that
unlimited incarceration of the debtor did not usually lead to reimbursing his creditors. 69
In addition, creditors came to believe that a law which was "all penalty and no reward" was
self-defeating; forcing bankrupts to relinquish all of their property to satisfy some creditors
and then exposing them to unlimited imprisonment by others encouraged evasion, even
by merchants who otherwise would have been willing to cooperate. 70 Finally, creditors
acknowledged that mercantile credit was given in the interest of the creditor, as well as of
the debtor, and that the giving of credit necessarily involved some risk and, therefore, it
followed that the business of the merchant should insure against this risk by adding on a
percentage for the credit which he advanced and that all a debtor ought to pledge to this
credit was his estate, and not his future earnings or personal liberty.71 Not until well into
the 19th Century did the notion of allowing a debtor to declare bankruptcy voluntarily
become a part of English bankruptcy law as a means of finding relief from creditors.
60. J. Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of Discharge
in Bankruptcy, 29 U. CHI. L. SCH. REC. 5,6 (Fall 1983), citing 13 Edw. 1, § 14 (1285).
61. Id. While some may argue that imprisoning the debtor was punitive in nature, the debtor
could always terminate his imprisonment by paying the debt.
62. 13 Elizabeth, c.7 (1571).
63. Jordan, supra. note 56, at 18.
64. "Acts of bankruptcy" include[d] the debtor's departure from the realm, his taking refuge in his
home, his taking sanctuary and various other acts if his purpose was to avoid process with the
intent of defrauding or hindering his creditors.
65. See Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. Ray. 1, 16-18 (1919).
66. D.G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 105-6 (1982).
67. 4 Anne c. 17 (1705); 10 Anne c. 15 (1711). These statutes applied only to merchants, however.
68. Jordan, supra. note 56, at 18.
69. Boshkoff, supra. note 66, at 69.
70. Levinthal, supra- note 65, at 18-19.
71. Cohen, supra. note 60, at 5-6.
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Insolvent debtors historically have received different treatment, dependent upon
whether they were merchants. A merchant was entitled to bankruptcy in which, upon sur-
render of his available assets, he was discharged from liability to his creditors. Insolvency
also applied to nonmerchants, who however, after released, remained obligated to pay the
remainder of their debt. Blackstone probably best expressed the rationale for restricting
bankruptcy to the merchants when he stated:
"But [the laws] are cautious of encouraging prodigality and extravagance by
this indulgence to debtors; and therefore they allow the benefit of laws of bankrupt-
cy to none but actual traders; since that set of men are, generally speaking, the only
persons liable for accidental losses, and to an inability of paying their debts without
any fault of their own. If persons in other situations of life run in debt without the
power of payment, they must take the consequences of their own indiscretion, even
though they meet with sudden accidents that may reduce their fortunes: the law
holds it to be an unjustifiable practice, for any person but a trader to encumber
himself with debts of any considerable value. If a gentlemen, or one in a liberal
profession, at the time of contracting his debts, has a sufficient fund to pay them,
delay of payment is a species of dishonesty, and a temporary injustice to his credi-
tor; and if, at such time, he has an insufficient fund, the dishonesty and injustice is
the greater. He cannot, therefore, murmur, if he suffers the punishment which he
has drawn upon himself. But in mercantile transactions, the case is far otherwise.
Trade cannot be carried on without mutual credit on both sides: the contracting of
debts is therefore here not only justifiable, but necessary. And if by accidental
calamities, as by loss of a ship in a tempest, the failure of brother traders, or by the
nonpayment of persons out of trade, a merchant or trader becomes incapable of
discharging his own debts, it is his misfortune and not his fault "7 2
In the United States, Congress was given the authority, under the Constitution, to enact
laws concerning bankruptcy. Every bankruptcy law in the United States has been the product
of some financial crisis or business depression. 73 The bankruptcy legislation in the United
States is a reflection of changes in economic conditions and viewpoints in this country.
Bankruptcy law in the United States has evolved through periods of pro-debtor tendencies,
pro-creditor tendencies and compromises between each. 74 The United States generally has
accepted the principle that bankruptcy is required in the public interest of the nation, apart
from the effect of the law upon particular individuals upon whom the law was to operate.
The interest of the nation lies in the continuation of business and the conservation of prop-
erty for the benefit of creditors and the debtor, and not in the sale and distribution of the
assets among the creditors, or even in the debtor's own immediate discharge from debt. The
forced sale of property and the stoppage of business in times of financial crisis constitutes a
loss to the nation at large, as well as to the individual debtors and creditors. 75 Thus, bank-
ruptcy law has developed into a system which attempts to achieve three objectives:
72. W. Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England, 417, 473-74 (photo reprint
1979)(1765-1769).
73. Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History, Harvard Press 9 (1935).
74. Id.
75. I&
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1. protect creditors from each other;
2. protect creditors from dishonest debtors; and
3. protect the honest debtor from his creditors by means of discharge. 76
Those laws that seek to protect creditors from one another attempt to prevent any one
creditor from obtaining more than its proportionate share of the debtor's assets. Such a
law provides for the collective execution of process directed against all of the property of
the debtor for the benefit of, and at the common expense of, all the creditors. When the
debtor is unable to pay all of its debts in full, the principle of contribution is invoked, and
any loss due to insolvency is thereby spread among all of the creditors. The bases for this
execution process are both social and economic. In order to achieve these objectives, a
method of managing the debtor's estate during the pendency of the process is required.
Some entity must be given control over all of the property of the debtor to collect, manage
and distribute all the assets. When this process is handled through bankruptcy law, the
expense of the process and depletion of the debtor's estate to the detriment of the creditors
is significant. 77 The objective in a consensual workout is, through a voluntary and forth-
right action by the debtor, to inspire in the creditors a high level of trust and confidence in
the debtor's adherence to the fundamental principles of bankruptcy law and the likelihood
of achievement of their mutual objectives by voluntary and consensual management, and
thereby to avoid the polarization and expense of a judicial achievement of those objectives
and to thereby maximize repayment.
VI. Consensual Workout Theory.
Consensual workouts are based upon the fundamental assumption that the debtor has
been honest and forthright in its operations and that current economic difficulties leading
to workout or reorganization are due to honest mistakes of business judgment or market
conditions not susceptible of anticipation or accommodation by the debtor. The systemic
problem of deteriorating capital adequacy is precisely such a circumstance. Resolution of
the resulting financial problems between a debtor and creditor then need not necessarily
be a violently adversary process. A calm and dispassionate evaluation of the factors lead-
ing to the defined economic problem, however, should lead to a fairly clearly defined set of
options under existing legal and financial structures for problem resolution. The mission
of both the debtor and the creditor in a consensual workout is to go past artificial adver-
sary posturing and to seek to understand the underlying root of the economic problem
and allocate the loss occasioned by that problem in accordance with the legal and econom-
ic facts. If both the debtor and the creditor see the facts clearly, their interests should be
aligned in resolving the allocation of loss in accordance with those facts and the law in the
most expeditious and efficient manner possible. These parties are in the position to suffer
the most pain in the absence of such a consensual agreement and are in the position to
76. Levinthal, supra note 70, at 25. It should be noted that not all systems of bankruptcy law seek
to achieve this third goal.
77. Warren, supra. note 73, at 112, citing AM. L. REv. VII (July 1873),"[F]rom the beginning to the
end, there is one continuous, increasing plucking at the estate. Merchants have come to
believe it best to settle with their debtors out of the bankrupt court. In its details, the law is
perplexing, cumbersome, annoying, and expensive"
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gain the greatest economic benefits from its success. A successful consensual workout
requires, and is the product of, this alignment and agreement
The organization of the legal and economic facts into a workout plan, however,
involves a complex interrelated set of decisions which, in each case, must be measured
against the available alternatives. The test in each case for each of the constituent decision
makers, both the debtor and the creditor, and the constituents within the debtor organiza-
tion, including partners, investors and employees, is to measure and prioritize the conse-
quences of each decision under various alternatives. A consensual workout should pro-
duce an alignment of the constituents' best legal, economic and personal interests. A cor-
rect alignment among the constituents in the face of the legal and economic facts will pro-
duce a will to action and to execution of the workout
Performance incentives or inducements can be built in with respect to any or all of
these constituents to further their will. Examples of such incentives or inducements
include preferential treatment for risk-taking by creditors, incentive fees or participation in
residuals and limitation or elimination of personal liability for debtors under certain cir-
cumstances. If will, action and performance by the debtor, combined with time and space
afforded by a consensual workout plan, will not produce a greater repayment to creditors
than a liquidation, the creditors will not permit any economic incentive or inducement to
such will, action and performance. The objective of the consensual workout and the defi-
nition of its success is the effectuation of the lowest cost and most efficient allocation of
loss on the most equitable basis, considering the facts and the law, which produces the
maximum repayment to creditors. Every decision and the consideration of every alterna-
tive must be considered against this test of success.
Debtors should be cognizant that, in many cases, lenders do not act rationally. The
motivation of loan officers and lender management is often inconsistent with their role in
the workout process. Many decision-making motivations for these individuals are person-
al and relate to internal politics in or external pressures on their employer organizations or
to regulatory pressures. Often, the responsible officers are not given any incentive to
understand and do not understand their factual and legal position. The debtor must be
mindful of the problems presented by these anomalous situations and of the effect of the
state of mind of the various decision makers on their approach to the workout process.
Although it is the objective of a consensual reorganization to avoid adversary position-
ing, it may be necessary for the debtor or for the creditors to utilize adversary tools, such as
bankruptcy proceedings, litigation and other aggressive and adversary actions, from time
to time, to level the field of negotiations and protect consensual participants from credi-
tors who seek to obtain an advantage without providing a corresponding benefit to the
consensual workout process or to force reluctant or misguided participants to the bargain-
ing table. This process is often required in one of two situations:
1. where responsibility for negotiations on behalf of a creditor must be moved out of the
hands of a defensive loan officer, who may desire to avoid the issues and protect his
personal position in the organization; or
2. where responsibility for negotiations on behalf of a debtor rests with an individual
whose ego and self image dominate strategy.
In each of these situations responsibility and control must be delegated and moved
into the hands of a professional problem solver. Creditors will often take a very tough
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position from both a legal and a business point of view to flush out the level of commit-
ment and will of a debtor who proposes a consensual workout or plan. The debtor must
remain calm, stick with the workout plan and utilize appropriate adversary proceedings
sparingly, but with sufficient definition and purpose, to protect its position and move the
workout process forward, stopping short of polarizing positioning.
The plan formulation process must recognize creditor preferences for reaching sepa-
rate individual workout agreements, rather than global agreements. Creditors consistently
demonstrate a strong desire to avoid master creditor agreements which extend over a long
period of time. Each plan, therefore, should seek to accommodate the individual creditor
relationships to the maximum possible degree through consistent treatment and, if possi-
ble, to accomplish satisfaction of undersecured or unsecured claims through available
assets which can be segregated on a fair and equitable basis. Only where unsecured and
undersecured claims cannot be satisfied in this way should a collateral pooling mechanism
be utilized. Creditors will often prefer to waive their unsecured claims or undersecured
claims to avoid the complication of participation in a complex collateral pool or they will
be willing to advance new funds outside of the collateral pool context, but subject to a
requirement for additional collateralization or specific cross-collateralization not related to
the other unsecured or undersecured claims, in effect, creating individual creditor-by cred-
itor collateral pools. An important component of the plan will be to clearly communicate
to the creditors that undersecured or unsecured claims can be waived, or collateralized, if
new consideration is given. In addition, if there is enough collateral to go around, and if it
can be divided equitably and if there is an incentive to the debtor to go through with this
process, a master, or global collateral pool may not be required.
The purpose of a collateral pool is to effect a mechanism to capture equity for repay-
ment of unsecured or undersecured creditors, subject to any reasonable residual incentives
reserved to the debtor. Collateral pools are an important plan component in consensual
reorganizations, but are not absolutely necessary if claims can otherwise be satisfied on a
fair and equitable basis.
A consensual workout plan is no panacea. There is no magic to the process; just the
hard work of uncovering, organizing and recording the economic and legal facts, develop-
ing a detailed knowledge of the circumstances and communicating these dearly and per-
sistently to the constituents of the plan. The legal and economic facts will define the plan,
and internal and external relationships will be changed, based upon the development of
these factual and legal positions. Development of a consensual workout plan is difficult
and requires the alignment of a large number of disparate parties, each of whom undoubt-
edly will recognize some change in their legal and economic position from the position
they thought they had before the process began. Those changes must be accepted and
alternative decisions based on the commonly understood legal and economic facts must be
measured, in each case, against the legal and economic alternatives, the anticipated effec-
tiveness of the workout plan and its cost measured against the cost of alternatives. Where
there are reasonable prospects for the development and execution of a consensual workout
plan, both the creditors and the debtor have the duty to pursue it and to honestly and vig-
orously seek its implementation.
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VII. Impact on Creditors.
Lessons learned by federal regulators in the Texas experience and in New England were
applied with swiftness to banks in other regions of the country. Regulators relied heavily
on the doctrine of bank safety and soundness in order to halt practices to which it object-
ed. Prior to the Texas experience, the application of the standard of safety and soundness
was unclear when applied to real estate loan portfolios and OREO and by extension to
LBO portfolios. Although no dear consensus has yet developed in the courts, the applica-
tion of the standard now has much more focus.
The statutory underpinning of safety and soundness is found in 12 U.S.C. § 1818,
which authorizes federal banking agencies to take enforcement action necessary to halt
unsafe and unsound banking practices. Such enforcement actions range from informal
administrative action, such as letters of commitment or board resolutions, through memo-
randa of understanding to cease and desist orders. These documents require the bank's
board to direct specific positive action by management and proscribe continued unsafe and
unsound practices and violations of law. The consequences of engaging in practices found
to be unsafe and unsound or in violation of law can include restitution for losses by and/or
civil monetary penalties against and/or temporary or permanent disbarment from the
banking industry of members of management and the board of directors. 78 Enforcement
actions often contain allegations of violations of law, fraud and breach of fiduciary obliga-
tions by directors and officers. The Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) 79 and the Crime Control Act of 1990 (CCA) 80 greatly expand-
ed the enforcement authority of regulators and increases civil penalties for violations.
Regulators applied the standards of safety and soundness subjectively based on a retro-
spective factual analysis. Consequently, bank management and its board of directors were
required to be proactive and anticipatory in demonstrating to regulators their awareness of
and serious concern for safe and sound practices. This awareness and concern must be
carefully documented. For example, documentation should show that the board and man-
agement are aware of the effect which explosive growth in non-performing assets can have
on the financial condition of the bank It should show that management has examined
and evaluated alternative courses of action. It should demonstrate that a specific course of
action has been adopted and put into effect. Most importantly, documentation should
demonstrate that the board and management have exercised reasonable business judgment
in dealing with the problem. Reasonable business judgment is generally regarded as the
ultimate standard to which management may be held accountable. However, some recent
public sentiment indicates a call for a higher and more rigorous standard of care by man-
agement in dealing with other people's money. Unless or until the requirement of a higher
standard of care actually develops, the reasonable business judgment should be the test of
managing the bank safely and soundly.
78. See J. Crawford, "Scandal Gives Parties a Chance to Fire Away at Each Other," 48 Cong. 2204,
2205 (1990). See also Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) PL-100-86 101 Stat. 552,
(codified in various sections of 2, 12, 15 and 31 U.S.C.) (1987). and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) PL-102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codi-
fied in various sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) (1991).
79. PL-101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in various sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) (1989).
80. PL-101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codifies in various sections of 11, 12, 18 and 28 U.S.C.) (1990).
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The early 1980's, late 1980's and early 1990's in the Southwest, New England and the
Middle Atlantic states, clearly demonstrated that the excesses in real estate, LBO's and ill con-
ceived mergers had created an absolute loss in value in many assets which were collateral for
banks' loans. This loss was systemic and unavoidable. It could not have been escaped by
"better underwriting.' Indeed, underwriting to a large degree had become irrelevant.
Thus, the task of bank asset management is to shift this unavoidable loss to others and
away from the bank to the greatest extent possible.
The shift of loss may be to the debtor or it may be to his other creditors who are not as
aware nor as proactive as bank.
VIII. Basic Principles of Loan Restructures.
A. BALANCING COLLECTION EFFORTS WITH EFFECT ON BANK RESULTS.
1. The dilemma: Ultimate loss protection vs. Non-Performing Asset Minimization.
" Banks are guarded by rating agencies and bank stock analysts on current and pro-
jected levels of nonperforming assets("NPAs") compared to total assets, loss reserve
and capital. High ratios cause higher cost of funds.
" Thus, management is deeply concerned about NPAs and reserves.
" The real loss is the ultimate loss on an asset. The rest is interim accounting.
" So which is more important? How do you balance these concerns?
" Establish a clear rule.
2. Regulator Confidence.
* Importance
" Benefit of doubt in close calls.
" Higher cut-off.
" Examiners examine from centralized, organized files. Examiners give no credit for
what's in your head or your desk file.
" Knowledge of credit and pursuit of a proactive plan action must be demonstrated by
road map memos.
" Examiners are the most experienced reviewers of appraisals today.
3. Rating Agency Expectations.
" Identify potential credit watch banks with regional statistics on vacancy, rent rates,
absorption, general business conditions and job creation.
" Are particularly interested in bank's tracking systems and early proactive address of
problems.
" Can have as much effect on bank earnings and capital as the examiners.
B. IMPORTANT ACCOUNTING ISSUES AND THEIR EFFECT ON WORKOUT ACTION.
Although Mexico and many Latin American countries do not follow U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), on March 11, 1996, officials at the Mexican
National Banking and Securities Commission announced that by January 1, 1997, Mexican
banks would be following accounting standards much closer to GAAP standards. When
implemented, "[aiccording to Jose Garcia-Cantrera, Latin American bank analyst at
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Solomon Brothers, the new accounting rules could mean that past due loans increase by as
much as 100 percent, which would cut in half the amount of reserves has against loans in
default." (Reuters, March 11, 1996, Mexico City). Suddenly, GAAP accounting issues are of
immediate importance to Mexican bankers and borrowers.
1. Capitalization of interest.
Capitalized interest on loans is defined as uncollected interest which is added to the
unpaid principal balance in accordance with a contractual loan agreement. 8 1
It is common in construction lending for the loan agreement to contain a line item
loan allocation for the costs of construction. One of the line items is often an "interest
reserve" out of which advances are made periodically to pay interest charges on the out-
standing balance of the construction loan. When construction is complete and all line
item allocations including the interest reserve are fully advanced, the loan is repaid
through permanent financing or sale of the project in the normal course of business. The
result, of course, is that the loan including the interest allocation is paid.
Capitalized interest concerns arise when the project loan is not paid at maturity
through permanent financing or sale as was expected. In these cases, the "interest reserve"
has been fully advanced, the loan has matured, but the source of repayment is delayed. If
the loan is renewed pending receipt of the source of repayment, the interest reserve by def-
inition has been capitalized into the loan.
Another situation causing interest capitalization concerns arises from opening a new
loan or increasing the original loan to create a new interest reserve to carry the renewed
loan pending its repayment. Depending on the source of repayment of the new loan, it
too may be deemed capitalized interest on the original loan.
Capitalization of interest for reporting purposes is appropriate only when the borrow-
er has the ability to repay the debt in the normal course of business. 82 The preceding sen-
tence does not mean that any construction loan which is not repaid at maturity must auto-
matically be placed on non-accrual. It is not unusual in the real estate development busi-
ness for permanent financings and sales to be temporarily delayed and for additional well
structured loans to be extended to pay interest on the original loan during the delay. The
purpose of this section is to give workout officers guidance on the circumstances under
which continued accrual is appropriate.
Capitalization of interest on short term real estate loans should be based upon the bor-
rower's ability to discharge the indebtedness in the normal course of business considering
the surrounding circumstances and based upon prudent credit judgment including source
of repayment and value of collateral.
The appropriateness of interest capitalization for accounting purposes is based pri-
marily on the creditworthiness of the borrower and guarantors. In addition to the general
criteria for creditworthiness, the following questions should be considered in determining
whether capitalization of interest is appropriable:
a. Was interest capitalization anticipated upon approval of the initial loan?
81. OCC Examining Circular 229.
82. Id.
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b. Is the loan well secured (i) by collateral that has a realizable value sufficient to dis-
charge the debt (including capitalized interest) in full, or (ii) by the guaranty of a
financially responsible and capable party?
c. Is repayment of the loan based upon a reasonably ascertainable event in the future?
d. Can the borrower obtain funds from sources other than the bank on similar terms
and rates?
e. Is there little or no doubt as to the ultimate collection of all principal and interest?
If the answer to these questions is predominantly affirmative, then capitalization of
interest may be acceptable. The primary test remains the overall credit quality of the loan.
Credits of sound quality may merit interest capitalization even if some of these questions
are answered negatively. However, only in very unusual circumstances will a loan classified
substandard merit interest capitalization.
2. Insubstance foreclosure (ISF).
Loans should generally be considered insubstance foreclosures where they meet all of
the following criteria:83
*a. The debtor has little or no equity in the collateral, considering the current fair value
of the collateral; and
b. Proceeds for repayment of the loan can be expected to come only from the opera-
tion or sale of the collateral; and
c. The debtor has either:
i. formally or effectively abandoned control of the collateral to the creditor, or
ii. retained control of the collateral but, because of the current financial condition of
the debtor, or the economic prospects for the debtor and/or the collateral in the
foreseeable future, it is doubtful that the debtor will be able to rebuild equity in
the collateral or otherwise repay the loan in the foreseeable future.
The first two criteria are used to identify situations where most of the risks and
rewards of ownership of the collateral have passed from the borrower to the bank Even if
the value of the collateral securing the loan has dropped so that there is little or no equity
in that particular investment, the borrower or guarantor may currently have demonstrable
sufficient strength or outside sources of cash to service and eventually retire the debt. In
such case, the second criteria is not met and there is no insubstance foreclosure. Thus,
value of collateral for a secured loan may drop to zero without a finding of ISF if the bor-
rower or guarantor has the demonstrable current wherewithal to repay the loan from other
sources. Likewise, if all loans to a borrower are cross collateralized and total debt is rea-
sonably exceeded by the value of all cross pledged collateral, then the first criteria is not
met and there is no finding of ISF.
83. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission FRR § 401.09(c)(FRR 28)(6AAP Release 17,9189),
See also, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 15, at paragraphs 28 and 29.
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The third criteria leaves room for subjective evaluation of the borrower's ability to
rebuild equity in the collateral or otherwise repay the loan in the foreseeable future. This
subjective evaluation should be prudently exercised by the workout officer and manage-
ment. For example, when using forecasts to assess the borrower's ability to repay the loan
or to assess the prospects for improvement in the value of the collateral, the workout offi-
cer making the determination should be mindful that the longer the time projected, the
less reliable the projected results. Projections should be reasonably near term and be based
on independently derived supportable assumptions.
Workout officers should be cognizant that determination of ISF affects only the bank's
accounting for a loan as substantially repossessed. Legal title to the asset remains in the
borrower until it is passed to the bank either consensually or through foreclosure. The
loan is not in default solely by being found to be an ISE It may be in the bank's best inter-
est to obtain control over the price and timing of the sale of the collateral to eliminate an
asset acquired for debt previously contracted as soon as possible, but action must be taken
in a way to protect the bank from lender liability allegations. Therefore, it is extremely
important for lending and supervised workout officers to maintain a course of dealing that
minimizes the bank's exposure to such allegations.
Even though an ISF real estate loan must be accounted for as OREO, compliance with
12 U.S.C. § 7.3025 is limited to the initial appraisal and annual reappraisal of the value of
the underlying real estate. It is not necessary to obtain prior regulatory approval to fund a
borrower's draw request8 4, although the bank may opt to refuse such funding under its
loan agreement if the loan is in default.
3. Troubled debt restructures.
A troubled debt restructure (TDR) is one "in which the bank, for economic or legal
reasons related to the borrower's financial difficulties, grants a concession to the borrower that
it would not otherwise consider."85
Basic knowledge of TDR accounting is important to workout officers in (a) preventing
nonaccrual status for certain loans and, (b) restoring existing non-accruals to performing
status. A finding that a restructure is a TDR requires the restructure to be carried on the
bank's financial statement as a nonperforming asset even if the loan is current as to interest.
TDR's are governed by FAS 1586 which is extremely complex. This section undertakes only
to outline the basic rules of TDR's and make certain suggestions rather than attempt a
comprehensive review of FAS 15.
The point is to make workout officers aware that a restructure that makes perfect busi-
ness sense may nonetheless be deemed a TDR by the bank's independent accountants with
the result that the goal of reducing non-accrual assets is not achieved. However, the work-
84. Conference with legal staff OCC Southwestern District Office.
85. Banking Circular 195, May 1, 1985, emphasis added.
86. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 15.
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out officer should not negotiate a less favorable business deal in an attempt to achieve
more favorable accounting treatment.
Because of the complexity of FAS 15, the advice and counsel of the bank's internal
accounting staff should be sought as soon as a plan begins to take shape and before com-
mitments are made to the borrower.
Note from the underscoring in the definition of TDR that the touchstone is granting
concessions because of the borrower's difficulty. For example, extending a loan at an interest
rate equal to that generally charged for loans with similar risk would not be a TDR even if
the rate were lower than the rate on the original loan.
If the new terms of the troubled debt restructuring provide for a reduction of either
interest or principal (referred to as a modification of terms), FAS 15 requires that the
recorded amount of the loan on the bank's books (principal plus accrued interest) be com-
pared to the total future contractual cash payments (including both principal and interest)
expected to be collected. A loss is recognized only if the total of such future combined pay-
ments is less than the recorded amount of the loan. Otherwise, no loss is recognized and
the only additional accounting requirement is to determine the new effective interest rate
for income recognition purposes. However, the restructured loan will be carried as a non-
performing asset.
Often, the new effective interest rate is equal to the stated loan rate included in the
restructured loan document. However, adjustments may be required if (a) the loan princi-
pal is reduced, (b) the new contractual rates are on a graduated basis (e.g. 8% first year,
10% second year, etc.), (c) due and unpaid interest is not added to principal or otherwise
included in the contractual interest rate amount, or (d) the repayment terms have other
unusual provisions. If an effective interest rate computation is required, it should be based
upon future contractual payment terms excluding all payments which are contingently
payable. This rate is calculated so as to yield a constant rate of interest over the remaining
life of the loan. It is expected the rate will generally be less than the original loan rate and
may be as low as zero without any requirement to recognize a loss.
Subject to the rules on capitalization of interest discussed in Section VII B(1), infra the
bank may extend additional credit to a borrower at interest rates below the current market
rate. Since this is a new loan to the same borrower, no special accounting rules apply.
Accordingly, discounting or loss recognition is not necessary. However, if the new loan is
granted in connection with the restructuring of an existing loan, it will be considered part
of the restructuring and accounted for as previously described.
In all troubled debt restructuring the collectibility of future payments may be ques-
tionable. Therefore, a credit analysis should be performed to determine if any additional
amounts should be charged to the allowance for loan losses. The analysis should include
the borrower's ability to meet the new terms of the loan based upon projected cash flows,
profitability and other credit factors.
C. How TO FORCE HIDDEN PROBLEMS TO THE SURFACE.
1. Strict Enforcement of Loan Agreement.
" Require full compliance with all conditions to new advances (advising borrower, if
necessary, that any prior waiver of certain conditions will no longer be granted).
" Make sure that financial statements and borrowing base/construction progress
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reports are provided on time and accompanied by any required certificate of com-
pliance.
" Obtain detailed computation of any financial covenants required by loan agree-
ments, such as current ratio, leverage ratio, tangible net worth, etc.
" Obtain on a regular basis agings of all payables and receivables and an analysis of
concentrations.
• Inspect borrower's book and records and properties as permitted by loan agreement.
2. No Reallocatiot
In order to keep a loan on accrual, the lending officer is sometimes tempted to reallo-
cate from, say, the tenant finish line items to the interest reserve after the initial interest
reserve has been depleted. The debtor will offer convincing arguments that tenant finish
requirements are lower or will be paid by the tenant. This type of action hides problems
because the tenant finish is always higher than originally projected, not lower.
3. Borrower's Deposits.
Borrower deposit requirements are included in loan agreements to capture the bor-
rower's cash into a project as soon as a line item cost overrun is known. Failure to exercise
this right allows the borrower to divert his cash to other uses thus exposing the bank to
additional cost and probable loss to complete the end of the job.
4. Borrowing Base Overadvances.
A dear sign of problems in an accounts receivable and inventory financing is when
the borrowing base report, either directly or indirectly through an analysis of specific
items contained therein, discloses that the principal balance of the loan exceeds the stipu-
lated borrowing base. In nearly all situations, the borrower will argue that the overad-
vance is temporary in nature and will correct itself over time so that a waiver should be
granted. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the overadvance will not cure itself over
time, and the bank is well advised not to grant the waiver unless the borrower makes spe-
cific concessions designed to protect the bank's interests (e.g., lock box, additional collat-
eral and/or personal guaranties).
5. Breaches of Financial Covenants.
A primary purpose of financial covenants in a loan agreement is to provide an early
warning signal of a borrower's potentially serious financial difficulties. Clearly, the financial
covenants will fail to serve such purpose if their breach is treated by the bank as a mere "tech-
nical" default and readily waived. The breach of any financial covenant should be carefully
analyzed to determine if it represents an isolated occurrence based on special circumstances
or is indeed a harbinger of future distress for the customer (and bank). If such breach raises
concerns, consideration should be given to obtaining specific concessions from the borrower
in exchange for granting a waiver. In any event, the waiver should always be given in writing
and make dear that it applies only to the specific date or period involved.
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D. UNDERSTANDING EcoNoMic AND MARKET FORCES.
1. Market for the Product.
In troubled real estate markets, the debtor often depletes his resources in covering
overhead or feeding projects with perceived positive potential. He has little left to support
the bank's projects.In these cases, the banks primary source of interest carry and principal payment is the
collateral itself. Thus, it is critical for the workout officer to know how to evaluate the pro-
ject. This is discussed in detail in Section VIII, infra.
2. Current Feasibility.
Appraisals are important in evaluating collateral, but appraisals do not produce the cash
to repay a loan. They only give an indication of what the collateral is worth on the day of the
appraisal. Consider that appraisals are for accounting purposes. The workout officer needs
to know current feasibility of the project. This is also expanded in section VII.A.3, infra.
3. Lease Rules.
" Importance of bank approval rights.
* Effect on value and salability.
" Free rent rules.
" Lease profitability rules.
4. Sales of subsidiaries.
In many highly leveraged transactions, it is common for the lender to require the par-
ent company borrower to grant liens in the stock or assets of subsidiary companies. While
the cash flow of the cofisolidated group may be sufficient to pay interest on the loan, the
sale of one or more subsidiaries may be needed to make principal payments. The sale of
subsidiaries may not have been contemplated at the time the leveraged buyout originally
occurred. In any case, the workout officer must carefully analyze the potential value of
various subsidiaries and their prospects for sale, taking into account that the overhead
charges allocated by the parent company to such subsidiaries may skew their apparent
operating results. Such analysis will require a review of consolidating financial statements
as well as the possible retention of an industry consultant.
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E. BANK'S RIGHTS TO COLLATERAL.
1. Negative Pledges.
The bank may have required a "negative pledge" which, although not acquiring a lien
against the assets, limits the debtor's right to dispose of or encumber certain assets. The
theory of a "negative pledge" is that the debtor agrees with the bank that it will not sell,
lease, convey, or otherwise dispose of specified assets of the debtor or permit to exist any
encumbrances with respect to such assets. The negative pledge may be coupled with the
debtor's agreement to provide collateral to the bank (i.e., that the debtor will execute docu-
ments necessary to grant the bank a lien against certain property) upon the happening of
certain events which typically may be tied to circumstances evidencing a deteriorating
financial condition of the debtor. This type of arrangement may provide little comfort to
the bank if the loan becomes troubled. To the extent that the debtor may be in default for
failure to make any required payments to the bank or is otherwise in default to the bank,
the debtor may have little motivation to deliver the requisite lien documents at that point,
as its failure to do so will simply be another event of default. The bank may be in no better
position than it would be if the loan were "unsecured," although the bank could perhaps
argue that the debtor's agreement and obligation to provide collateral is specifically
enforceable or that the collateral is held in a constructive trust for the benefit of the bank.
Significant litigation expense would likely be incurred in such cases.
2. Assignment of partnership interests.
In a restructure or in connection with the original loan, the bank may attempt to
obtain or may have obtained a collateral assignment of a partnership interest held by the
borrower. The assignment of the partnership interest should in most cases be a collateral
assignment (security interest or lien on the partnership interest) and not an absolute
assignment (bank owns partnership interest) in order to avoid obligating the bank for any
partnership duties or liabilities. Prior to obtaining an assignment of a partnership interest,
the partnership agreement should be reviewed with the bank's counsel in order to deter-
mine any issues relating to partner's consents to a transfer, securities law restriction and
future capital contribution obligations of the partner. The collateral assignment of the
partnership interest typically will provide the bank with a more valuable asset - the entire
equity interest - than simply an assignment of proceeds from the partnership interest.
3. Assignment of proceeds.
In connection with a restructure, a bank may attempt to obtain an assignment of pro-
ceeds from certain collateral, typically a partnership interest or some types of contracts
(e.g. lot sale contracts, income generating service contracts). The assignment of proceeds
will typically only provide the bank with remedies or recourse in the event proceeds are
received by the borrower from a partnership interest or from contracts and such proceeds
are not delivered to the bank. The bank will not have obtained a security interest in or lien
on the actual interest which produces the proceeds, so the true balance sheet value of such
an assignment may be nominal. In certain cases (e.g. service contracts) the bank may very
well not want to obtain an assignment of a contract so as not to impose liability on the
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bank. One other consideration is that if bankruptcy is likely the proceeds received by the
bank within the preference period prior to bankruptcy may be required to be disgorged.
(4) Liens, senior and subordinate.
Typically, the bank will obtain a first or senior lien on the primary collateral for its
loan. In many instances, either in obtaining additional collateral for the original loan or in
shoring up a troubled loan, the bank may have acquired a subordinate lien on an addition-
al piece of collateral. The subordinate lien would be subject to one or more prior liens in
favor of other creditors. An analysis of the actual value of the subordinate lien must
include consideration of the total value of the collateral, the amount of debt secured by
senior or prior liens against the collateral and the actual willingness of the bank to advance
funds to protect its interest in the collateral in the event the borrower is in default in pay-
ments to a senior lienholder or in the event the senior lienholder exercises remedies against
the collateral. Another consideration in the use of a subordinate lien is to "tie up" the col-
lateral so that no consensual sale or conveyance of the collateral by the borrower can occur
without the bank having the opportunity to require payment of the proceeds from the sale
of the property to the bank prior to the release of its lien.
5. Related personal property.
Often loans secured by real property will be additionally secured by personal property
and fixtures used in connection with the real property. The bank should have valid securi-
ty interests that have been perfected by financing statements currently filed and effective
with the property filing offices. Liens on personal property are extremely important in
relation to multifamily properties and hotel properties.
6. Remedies under UCC Article 9.
Upon default in a loan secured by personal property which is subject to a valid and
enforceable security interest under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9
affords the secured creditor the foliowing non-judicial (i.e., self-help) remedies:
a. right to notify account debtors to make payment directly to the secured creditor;
b. right to repossess tangible collateral without causing a breach of the peace;
c. right to require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available at a reason-
ably convenient location designated by the secured creditor;
d. right to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the loan; and
e. right to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the collateral by public or private proceedings.
The most significant remedy available under Article 9 is the secured creditor's right,
after giving prior notice to the debtor and certain other interested parties, to conduct a pri-
vate or public sale of all or a portion of the collateral without any judicial involvement.8 7
87. UCC § 9-504.
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While the power of sale under Article 9 represents an efficient method of liquidating col-
lateral, there is imposed on the secured creditor the responsibility of assuring that every
aspect of the sale if conducted in a "commercially reasonable" manner.88 Article 9 does
not expressly define what constitutes "commercially reasonable" conduct, and litigation
has frequently resulted seeking to determine whether a secured creditor's conduct was
commercially reasonable in the specific circumstances presented. The importance of con-
ducting the Article 9 sale in a commercially reasonable manner is that the secured creditor
who fails to meet this standard may be denied the right to pursue any deficiency claim
against the debtor or any guarantor and may be restrained from or ordered to conduct the
sale in a specified manner or be liable for damages.89
7. Bank's remedies - local law determination.
The determination of the specific legal remedies available to the bank in the event of a
loan default is made under the local law of the governing jurisdiction and is an inherent
part of that state's economic and political structure. The workout officer must consult with
the bank's legal department and local legal counsel to ascertain the legal advantages and
disadvantages of specific workout structures and enforcement strategies.
F. OvERvIEw OF BORROWER'S PROBLEMS.
1. Federal income tax liability.
A properly counseled debtor will first be concerned with his liability for income tax
arising from involuntary or voluntary conveyance of title to collateral or from forgiveness
of debt. Income tax planning is a very significant element of virtually every real estate
workout. In fact, in many workouts, the tax considerations become the single most impor-
tant factor in developing a strategy and ultimate consummation of the workout Although
certain taxes incurred more than three years before the filing of a bankruptcy petition may
be dischargeable in bankruptcy, more recent federal income taxes, including taxes generat-
ed pursuant to the transactions involved in the workout, are not dischargeable.
Consequently, it may be advisable for the debtor to pursue virtually any course that would
minimize federal tax liabilities, including incurring additional personal liability which may
be subsequently discharged in bankruptcy.
a. Information To Be Gathered.
In order to apply the foregoing legal principles and to further develop the strategies
described below, the following information must be examined:
i. A detailed description of each asset owned by the debtor, including its fair market
value, adjusted tax basis, and usage by the debtor (i.e. investment, personal, trade
or business, inventory, etc.).
88. UCC § 9-504(3); see also UCC § 9-507(2).
89. UCC § 9-507.
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ii. A detailed description of all fixed and contingent liabilities of the debtor, includ-
ing whether they are recourse or non-recourse, guaranteed, seller-financing, etc.
iii. All agreements relating to the assets and liabilities of the debtor, including notes,
loan agreements, guarantees and partnership agreements.
b. Analysis and Strategies.
In a comprehensive real estate workout, the following steps of tax planning and analy-
sis must be taken:
i. Evaluate the market value, indebtedness and adjusted basis of each property and
determine the taxable gain or loss that would be recognized upon the voluntary
or involuntary conveyance of each such property.
ii.Determine the taxable income of the debtor for the current taxable year to date
and project the taxable income for the remainder of the year, other than income
or loss that may be generated upon the disposition of the real properties.
iii. Determine the solvency or insolvency of the debtor.
iv. Determine the practical likelihood of bankruptcy and the willingness of the
debtor to consider bankruptcy.
v. Consider and plan for the amount of gain or loss and timing of disposition of
each and every property of the debtor.
2. Reputation, future earning power and family.
A debtor will be concerned with his reputation in the community since it will greatly
affect his ability to earn money in the future. These concerns are driven by his perceived
need to preserve a reasonable life style for himself and his family. These are powerful psy-
chological motivations and should not be treated lightly by the workout officer.
3. Alternatives.
Absent fraud or other malfeasance, a borrower can accomplish his objectives by filing
for bankruptcy, an action which is expensive and time consuming for the bank, invariably
leads to greatly reduced value of collateral if the stays are finally lifted or may expose the
bank to a cram down plan of reorganization resulting in write downs and permanently
nonperforming assets. Thus, heavy handed action by a workout officer without considera-
tion of the factors described above can adversely affect the bank. Conversely, if the bank is
an undersecured or unsecured creditor, it may prefer the debtor to be in bankruptcy in
which case a different approach is appropriate. As noted in section VIIIA., infra the facts
generated in connection with the initial analysis of the existing status of the credit will dic-
tate the workout plan.
G. BASIC WORKOUT STRATEGY.
Time is always critical. First, it is important to the bank's well being that nonperform-
ing and classified assets be reduced quickly. Second, if the workout plan requires foreclo-
sure and resale, ultimate actual loss is minimized by doing so as quickly as possible espe-
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cially in a deteriorating market. Finally, the bank is greatly benefitted by achieving its
workout before other creditors are mobilized.
It is imperative to understand the bank's plan and focus on alternatives for achieve-
ment of the plan. The workout officer should prioritize actions to achieve the plan and
move quickly and effectively with these actions. Remain calm and cool; avoid recrimina-
tions in meetings and exchanges where the borrower or guarantor face the same facts you
have uncovered. Do your best to avoid exchanges of legalism which polarizes the objec-
tives. Seek to align the borrower's and guarantor's plan with that of the bank. The officer
should remember to stick to the loan documents and the bank's legal position within the
context of the bank's plan. All parties should focus on a resolution and not waste money
and time arguing about "who shot John.'
1. Objective: Prevent Non-Performing Asset Classification.
The first goal of every workout plan is to prevent the subject loans from being placed
on non-accrual or to restore the subject loans to accrual status, if possible. If accrual is not
possible, then the plan goal is to minimize interim charge-offs and ultimate actual loss.
2. Downside Protection.
It is axiomatic that the lender who (1) addresses problems with the debtor first, (ii)
acts consistently and in good faith, (iii) addresses debtor concerns, and (iv) is knowledge-
able, reasonable and creative will achieve a better solution to a troubled credit whether that
solution is loan restructure or amicable acquisition of title to collateral. Debtors, however,
are not always cooperative. Thus, the workout officer must put the bank in the strongest
position if restructure efforts fail and the relationship becomes acrimonious. Always first
position the bank for maximum recovery if the events critical to the workout's success do
not occur.
The following actions should be part of, or at least given consideration in formulating,
every workout plan:
a. Find the best available collateral and get it pledged to support future value declines,
accrued unpaid interest or possible working capital loans. The best collateral is that
which produces income in addition to value.
b. Get all unsecured debt secured by anything of real value immediately.
c. Control the cash flow of the bank's collateral by entering into a cash collateral agree-
ment with the debtor under which he pays over monthly to the bank all net operat-
ing income without deduction for capital improvements, taxes or insurance. The
expense component of monthly NOI should be tightly negotiated and the debtor
should agree to strict accounting subject to audit by the bank. Refusal of the debtor
to comply with these requirements is a clear indication of bad faith necessarily
requiring the workout officer to control cash flow through the bank's legal remedies.
d. Get all loans to the debtor cross collateralized and cross defaulted as an early objec-
tive. If cross collateralization cannot be obtained at the asset level because of owner-
ship by partnerships without common partners, at least obtain cross collateraliza-
tion of all the common partnership interests. The workout officer can expect a
sophisticated debtor to use granting of cross collateralization as a bargaining chip,
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for example, for a working capital loan or release of liability. Any other deficiencies
discovered in the analysis of the documentation should be corrected in any restruc-
ture modification agreement relating to a troubled credit.
e. Get the bank's deal done before other creditors wake up. Start the preference period
running.
3. Press remedies in the documents.
Correctly drafted loan documents will provide for non-monetary covenants, under-
takings and representations and warranties by the borrower. Non-compliance with these
provisions usually constitutes a default after appropriate notices to the borrower and his
failure to cure within the time limits provided. Often it is necessary to get the attention of
an uncooperative borrower by methodical enforcement of the bank's rights and remedies
under the loan documents. Such enforcement should stay strictly within the bounds of the
documents (e.g., written notice, grace period, etc.) in order to avoid allegations of lender
liability. By demonstrating its seriousness through methodical enforcement of rights and
remedies, the bank encourages the borrower to be willing to negotiate restructure.
Even after restructure negotiations begin, the bank should continue to give all notices
and other actions required of it by the documents. The bank can always suspend legal
enforcement if negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily, but not lose time (and money)
through a "start-stop-start" approach to enforcement if negotiations break down.
To avoid surprising the borrower (which often leads to emotional allegations of bad
faith by him), the bank should inform the borrower at the outset of negotiations that it
intends to follow this dual track course of action (legal enforcement while simultaneously
negotiating).
4. Encourage borrower's proposals.
The borrower should be encouraged to propose solutions to the problem. By encour-
aging borrower's proposals the workout officer keeps the borrower involved and obtains
insight into the borrower's management ability.
5. Be responsive, but firm and skeptical.
Be skeptical of the debtor's optimistic projections of lease up, rent rates, low tenant
finish requirements, sales volume, sales prices and operating income. The market is always
worse than the developer perceives. Feasibility analysis previously ordered will give the
workout officer his own independent realistic view of the market. The restructure should
be based on the realistic view.
Set performance benchmarks in the restructure which the debtor must meet to earn
the right to continue the workout. Make them reasonably achievable, but not easy. Often
the debtor will propose a "cash flow" mortgage to the bank. In all but the rarest circum-
stances, the workout officer should reject such a proposal. Cash flow mortgages leave the
debtor in control of timing and pricing of sale, give him the opportunity to manipulate net
operating income to the disadvantage of the bank (even if he has executed a cash collateral
agreement) and leave the bank with all of the risk of value decline either from market dete-
rioration or from debtor mismanagement. If a cash flow mortgage is accepted, it must be
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made "defaultable" by requiring a minimum monthly payment regardless of cash flow and
prompt payment by the debtor of taxes and insurance.
Some debtors with many lenders will propose a consensual reorganization of their
business in an attempt to reach a global resolution of all their debt, see Sections V and I,
supra. Even though these plans usually involve cash flow mortgages (called "pass-
throughs"), they should not be rejected out of hand. Features of such plans also include a
"collateral pool" into which the debtor places all of his business assets for the benefit of all
of his creditors and usually involve partial or complete release from liability. The plan
requires equal treatment of all creditors and full disclosure. They are similar in many
respects to bankruptcy but without judicial supervision. If the bank is under secured even
after cross-collateralization, it may be beneficial to consider consensual reorganization to
gain access to the collateral pool. The plans are extremely complex and should be dis-
cussed thoroughly with the workout officer's manager.
6. One broken promise for another.
Do not trade one broken promise to pay for a new promise to pay. Always obtain
something tangible for any concession, however small.
7. Borrower's affidavits.
When problems begin to arise with respect to a lending relationship, a bank finds it
increasingly difficult to get current financial information from the borrower. Its borrower
may well be encountering difficulties with other creditors and will want to reveal as little
information as possible about its current affairs while it considers possible courses of
action to protect its interests as against all creditors. The bank's ability to evaluate the sta-
tus of the loan and the prospects for repayment are made more difficult by its inability to
determine the overall financial condition of the borrower. It is essential that the bank
obtain a full and complete disclosure of the financial condition of the borrower as a part of
and as a condition precedent to any workout arrangement. The borrower should provide
a detailed sworn financial statement which described and identifies all assets and liabilities
and prior transfers of assets. The affidavit of financial condition, when examined against
prior financial information received from the borrower, may assist the bank in identifying
any fraudulent transfers which may have been made by the borrower and also should pro-
vide the bank with either support for the borrower's oral representations regarding its
financial condition or reveal that the borrower has been untruthful or fraudulent during
workout discussions. The borrower should be able to show that his financial affairs are
such that a restructure of a problem loan can be successful in order for a bank to consider
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that alternative. Likewise, to the extent that a borrower who claims to have few assets from
which the creditor may recover seeks to be released from liability in consideration of his
cooperating with the bank in the bank's realization on any collateral for the loan, the bor-
rower should be able to evidence such financial condition to the bank
H. TECHNIQUES TO MAINTAIN LOAN PERFORMANCE.
1. Unsecured loans, additional collateral, cross collateralization.
A primary objective in any workout is to improve the bank's prospects for repayment
by obtaining any new collateral which is available to be pledged to it In the case of an
unsecured loan, obtaining collateral, even if it provides considerably less than fill coverage
for the loan, will be the only means of acquiring a specific source of repayment and pre-
vents the bank from being treated in the same manner as the borrower's trade creditors
who, in a bankruptcy context, will receive only pennies on the dollar.
Even if the bank's loan is currently secured, there may be additional collateral which is
available to be pledged to improve the bank's secured status. Obviously, assets which are
currently unencumbered are the best form of collateral. However, it may be extremely
advantageous for the bank to obtain a lien against assets which have previously been
encumbered since the current or future value of such assets may exceed the amount of the
first lien. In evaluating the borrower's assets which may be available to serve as collateral,
do not hesitate to be creative. For example, a borrower's intangible assets, such as patents,
copyrights, trademarks, servicemarks and franchise rights, could be very valuable but may
not have been taken as collateral by other lenders who only loan against "hard" assets.
An extremely important objective in any workout is for the bank to obtain cross collat-
eralization of all of its loans. Cross collateralization means that particular assets serve as
collateral for more than one loan or indebtedness. For example, if a bank's relationship
with its borrower consists of a revolving line of credit secured by accounts receivable and
inventory, a term loan secured by equipment and real estate an letters of credit secured by
the proceeds of specific contracts, the workout officer's objective would be to revise the
existing documents to make sure that all the assets which have been pledged by such bor-
rower secure all three types of financing provided. The reason that cross collateralization
is so important is that it will enable the bank to apply "excess" value attributable to collat-
eral for one loan against the outstanding balance of another loan. Using the example dis-
cussed above, it is quite conceivable that if the borrower were to file for bankruptcy, its
accounts receivable and inventory which secure the revolving line of credit would be insuf-
ficient to pay off such line of credit. On the other hand, liquidation of the borrower's
equipment and real estate may result in proceeds in excess of the term loan. Unless the
revolving line of credit and term loan were cross collateralized, the bank would not be
entitled to apply the excess proceeds of equipment and real estate to the outstanding bal-
ance of the revolving line of credit, thereby resulting in a loss on the revolving line of credit
which would otherwise be avoided.
2. Cash collateral agreements.
Often the bank will be faced, in a workout situation, with the opportunity to enter into
an agreement with a borrower whereby the borrower will turn the revenues from the
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property over to the bank and the bank will be allowed to deal with the property by taking
control of the property and managing it prior to the time that the bank actually acquires
the property pursuant to a foreclosure action. Generally, the bank is presented this oppor-
tunity in relation to income producing real estate, and it may appear to be an ideal way to
obtain possession of the revenue from the property and protect the collateral pending
foreclosure. When the bank and a borrower agree to this type of arrangement, they usual-
ly enter into a cash collateral agreement to govern the collection and application of the
rents from the property. The borrower generally attempts to obtain a full release and an
indemnification from the bank in relation to the activities of the bank during the period
that the bank is in possession of the property prior to the bank's acquisition of the proper-
ty through foreclosure. Notwithstanding that a cash collateral agreement may seem to be
the ideal arrangement in cases where the foreclosure process is lengthy, there are numerous
pitfalls which the bank should consider.
Once the bank takes possession of the property it becomes a "mortgagee in posses-
sion?' This term has slightly different meanings in various jurisdictions; however, the prin-
ciples and warnings set forth below are generally applicable. A mortgagee in possession is
one who takes possession of property pursuant to a contract (e.g., a cash collateral agree-
ment) and is entitled to remain in possession until the bank's debt is paid in full.
Generally the standard of care of a mortgagee in possession is that of a constructive
trustee and the mortgagee is under a duty to manage the property in a reasonably prudent
and careful manner in order to keep the property in a good state of preservation and to
make it productive. When a mortgagee comes into possession of the property in other
than a lawful manner, then the mortgagee generally is responsible for the reasonable rental
value of the property, if any, during the time the mortgagee is in possession. If the mort-
gagee's possession is lawful, then the mortgagee must account for the rents and profits
received or which might have been received by the use of reasonable diligence and care.
The mortgagee in possession may be liable as the landlord under the leased that cover the
property and will be liable for negligent acts occurring on the property. Indemnities from
borrowers are generally of little or no help in protecting the bank; however, insurance can
cover some of the risk assumed by a mortgagee in possession.
Because of the bank's control over the borrower and the property resulting from its
being a mortgagee in possession, there are number of lender liability concerns which should
be considered. If a borrower subsequently seeks the protection of the bankruptcy courts and
the bank is found to be in control of the borrower's business, the bankruptcy court has the
power to "equitably subordinate" the bank's lien to the liens of other creditors. If the bank is
found to be in control of the borrower's business, it can be held liable under federal and state
environmental statutes for the cost of deanup of various hazardous wastes. Certain liability
for federal withholding taxes also can be successfully asserted by the Internal Revenue Service
if the bank controls the borrower's business. In addition, notwithstanding the fact that the
bank may act properly, a borrower seeking to prevent foreclosure may raise allegations of
improprieties related to the bank's possession of the property which the borrower may allege
prevented the borrower from making payments on the debt.
There are circumstances when the bank will clearly desire to become a mortgagee in
possession (e.g., where the borrower has abandoned the property). However, in most cases
careful consideration should be given to the facts surrounding a proposed cash collateral
agreement and the circumstances relating to the collateral, especially in light of the numer-
ous liabilities which inure to a mortgagee in possession. If the risks are such that a cash col-
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lateral agreement is deemed to be appropriate and possession of the property is desirable,
the provisions of the agreement with the borrower should be carefully drafted to protect the
bank. The bank should attempt to structure a cash collateral agreement under which the
borrower retains control of the property by leaving the borrower responsible for the man-
agement and operation of the property while obtaining the net revenues from the property.
3. Loan splitting.
A $10,000,000 loan on an office building which is producing $600,00 in NOI from credit
tenants. No outside support available from the debtor/guarantor. No concessions on rate or
terms other than extension of maturity are made. Can the loan be internally restructured on
the bank's books as a $5,000,000 performing loan ($600,000/$5,000,000 = market rate) and a
$5,000,000 non-accrual loan? Generally no. If there is no outside debtor/guarantor support
and the building produces $600,000 in NOI, it will be difficult to show a value in excess of
the $10,000,000 loan amount. These factors would combine to produce an insubstance fore-
closure (See section VII B(2), supra). If an independent, accurate appraisal of the building
showed value in excess of $10,000,000, then the workout officer should discuss the possibility
of this internal "restructure" with the bank's internal accountants.
One exception to the general rule is a change in circumstance after the loan has been
placed on nonaccrual and been charged down. For example, a new credit-worthy tenant
could be obtained producing new cash flow which would carry and begin amortizing the
loan as charged down. In such case, the loan may be returned to accrual.
4. Trading borrowers.
Original borrower arranges to sell project for amount equal to current debt to unrelat-
ed buyers. Bank agrees to finance 100% of purchase price for new buyers at below market
rate but no other concessions such as limited liability to new buyers. The new loan is not
technically a TDR under FAS 15 because it is not to the original borrower. However, the
new loan may still be a non-performing asset if there was a finding that the original loan
was an insubstance foreclosure because the downpayment requirement of 12 U.S.C. §
7.3025 and FAS 66 was not met. Even if there was no finding of insubstance foreclosure,
the principal balance of the new loan may be required to be marked to market to reflect a
below-market interest rate. These are only two of many complex considerations. Advice
of the bank's internal accountants should be sought early on.
Warning. Workout officers are often tempted to negotiate with in-house and indepen-
dent accounts to comply with the literal accounting rules and to twist the deal to meet
accounting requirements. The new borrower immediately picks up on the bank's prob-
lems and extracts substantive concessions for his cooperation in helping the bank with its
accounting issues. This often weakens the restructure and can led to greater ultimate loss.
Build hammers, not watches.
5. Additional compensation for added risk
Obviously, if the bank structures a workout with the borrower that reduces the bank's
current return, causes it current loss or exposes it to future loss, the bank should be and is
entitled to a higher reward. The bank contracted for interest risk and interest reward, if
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the bank's risk is converted to equity risk, it should participate to some degree in equity
reward if such occurs because of a rising market.
However, the bank must beware of lender liability issues inherent in increasing its
reward. The bank must maintain its position as a secured lender and not a partner of the
debtor.
6. Marketing agreements with borrower.
As an alternative to forced liquidation of assets and litigation, a bank may consider
affording the borrower a reasonable period of time in which to market the property prior to
the bank's ultimate enforcement of its remedies pursuant to the loan documents. The bank
may assist the borrower in its marketing efforts by obtaining from the borrower a nonexclu-
sive right to market the property. The bank must exercise care in this area to avoid the exer-
cise of control over the borrower which could subject the bank to potential claims.
I. BORROWER CONFERENCES.
1. Purpose.
When arranging a conference with the debtor, the workout officer should specify the
purpose of the meeting. The debtor should then be informed that the initial meeting will
commence with execution of the pre-workout agreement which should be provided to the
debtor in advance. He should be advised to come prepared to bring the bank up to date
on his financial condition, cash flow, property status, other debt and other pertinent top-
ics, and to present his own workout alternatives.
Debtors may approach this meeting with a "wait and see" attitude to get an under-
standing of what types of alternatives the bank will consider before they make a proposal.
The meeting will be more productive if the workout officer encourages the debtor to make
a proposal at the meeting.
2. How to Prepare
In order to conduct a meaningful and fruitful working meeting, the workout officer
must be prepared to enter into an open-minded discussion of the facts as presented by the
debtor so he can fully understand the circumstances and review alternatives, some of
which may be suggested by the debtor. By beginning the working conference in this man-
ner, the workout officer can establish the "ground rules" for future discussions, the results
of which will be more fruitful under these circumstances.
Because of the debtor's potential fears or anger, the conference may become antagonis-
tic and unproductive. For this reason, the workout officer must have the discipline and
professional attitude to maintain the purpose of the meeting and maintain the "ground
rules" for meaningful resolution.
3. Use of attorneys.
Many conferences relating to workout resolution can be handled directly between the
workout officer and the debtor. Depending upon the nature of the workout, the size of the
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loan and the potential for non-accrual or loss, certain discussions should include an addi-
tional workout officer, preferably the group manager. If a debtor indicates he will arrive at
a meeting with his attorney, the workout officer must review the situation with his manag-
er to determine if it is appropriate for the bank to engage legal counsel at this juncture. By
all means, when an attorney for the debtor is present, the workout officer should include in
the conference his manager or legal counsel so two people are representing the bank.
Examples of instances when the meeting should include the bank's legal counsel follow:.
• Debtor has made claims of lender liability.
" Litigation between the bank and the debtor is pending or being actively considered.
" Debtor has revealed plans to file bankruptcy.
" The workout officer considers there are issues for which a claim may arise in the
future against the bank.
" Debtor's relationship is already antagonistic, in which case the bank may be best served
by utilizing legal counsel as the primary contact with the workout officer support.
" A discussion of legal issues is expected.
Prior to the meeting, either the workout officer, his manager, or another workout
employee should be designated as the person to take notes and prepare a follow-up memo-
randum summarizing the meeting.
4. Topics for Discussion.
Topics for discussion include:
" Status of debtor's loans with other creditors.
" Status of debtor's other real and personal property investments (leasing, cash flow).
" Status of pending transactions or litigation which may positively or negatively
impact the debtor's financial condition.
" Possibility of raising additional equity, refinancing, sales.
" Future plans.
" Operating standards for the collateral property during the period of negotiations
(What happens to the cash? Is the property secure?)
At the initial debtor conference, the workout officer should explain the bank's require-
ments regarding turnover of property NOI and present the debtor with the proposed cash
collateral agreement discussed above. One objective is to make clear to the debtor that the
bank intends to enforce its remedies thoroughly.
5. Memorializing Meeting and Next Steps.
Immediately after the meeting, the person designated to summarize the meeting in
report form generates a report memo. The original of the memo should be sent to the
Credit file with a copy sent to each participant. The memo should be factual, objective,
and not draw any subjective conclusions as to the outcome of negotiations.
As a result of conferences with the debtor and his analysis of information provided,
the workout officer will have obtained new information which must be investigated and
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verified in order to fully understand the debtor's financial condition and the potential for
repayment from liquidation or refinancing of the collateral. As the workout officer assess-
es certain key factors, and defines more clearly the particular problems, resolutions can
then be developed.
Essentially, there are four options which can apply in a workout:
• Reinstatement of the loan.
" Restructure.
" Foredosure.
" Negotiation of a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.
As stated above, the workout officer must remain mindful of the bank's objectives and
the debtor's concerns discussed above in developing his proposed resolution.
J. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELEASES.
If a bank and a borrower determine that the loan will be restructured, it is important
that the parties focus on the lending relationship going forward and that any disputes
which have arisen during the term of the loan be laid to rest As a part of a bank's agree-
ment to restructure a loan, the bank should require the borrower to release the bank from,
and indemnify the bank against, all claims and causes of action which the borrower may
have against the bank in relation to the loan arising prior to the time of the restructure.
To the extent that resolution of a problem loan involves the bank's foreclosure of its
lien against property or a conveyance to the bank by deed in lieu of foreclosure, the bor-
rower and any guarantors may have negotiated a release from all or a portion of personal
liability in connection with the loan. To ensure that the borrower any guarantors do not
interfere with the bank's exercise of its foreclosure rights, it may be appropriate to condi-
tion their releases on their not taking any such actions. Because the borrower's overall
financial condition may be in jeopardy and there is the possibility of a bankruptcy filing by
the borrower, it may also be appropriate to provide that the releases of the borrowers and
any guarantors will not be effective in the event of a bankruptcy filing for a one-year or
longer period following foreclosure to the extent that the foreclosure is set aside by a court
of competent jurisdiction.
K. MULTI-CREDITOR LOANS AND RELATIONSHIPS.
There are several distinct types of multiple creditor loans. In the lending community
the word "participation" is often used generically to describe a multiple creditor loan.
However, it is helpful to categorize the types of arrangements between creditors. Loan par-
ticipations are those loans where the "lead lender" sells a participation to one or more
other creditors in the loan made by the lead lender to a borrower. A participation is evi-
denced by a participation agreement and a participation certificate executed by the partici-
pant and the lead lender. There is only one note and only one set of security documents.
The participant's rights are contained in the participation agreement with the lead lender.
A loan syndication, on the other hand, is an arrangement where each creditor has a direct-
creditor relationship with the borrower. There are several types of syndications including
agented credits, non-agented credits governed by an intercreditor agreement, and arrange-
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ments where each creditor has a separate agreement with the borrower. The problems
encountered by the bank in the workout of a multiple creditor loan vary depending upon
whether the bank is the lead lender, a participant or part of a bank group governed by an
intercreditor agreement.
1. Considerations of lead lender or agent.
Set forth below are some of the issues that should be considered by the lead lender or
agent.
a. Documentation.
The bank should carefully review the documentation which relates to the participa-
tion or the syndication. The participation agreement, agent's agreement or intercreditor
agreement will spell out the duties and obligations of the lead lender in relation to the other
creditors that are participants in the loan. A thorough understanding of the position of the
lead lender or agent and its duties and obligations is necessary for the bank to proceed
through the workout process. Under no circumstances should the bank take an action which
is not authorized by the loan documents or the documents governing the multi-creditor
relationship. The bank's failure to honor the contractual obligations in the agreements can
subject the lead lender or agent to liability to the other creditors and the borrower.
b. Is the Participation Interest a Security?
If the participation interest is characterized as a security, the lead lender may have
other responsibilities to the participants in relation to the loan. The note or the participa-
tion agreement may be a security under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. If the participation interest is a security, the offer and sale of the
security would be subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the applicable securities acts.
Whether the participation interest in any given situation is a security depends upon many
factors. Even if an exemption is relied upon, the bank must be sure to make full disclosure
to the participants at all times during the administration and workout of the loan.
c. Conflicts of Interest.
Generally, participations and syndications involve large lending relationships where
the lead lender or agent has other loans to the borrower, guarantors, or affiliates of the
borrower. Full disclosure of the lead lender's relationships is essential when the loan is
sold or syndicated. If during the workout process it is discovered that there is or were con-
flicts or potential conflicts, they should be dealt with openly and fully disclosed. It is
important to remember that when the loan becomes troubled the participants will likely
not share a common view as to what the proper course of action may be to resolve the
problems with the borrower. The various participants will have different financial
resources, different guidelines for loan workouts, different regulatory pressures and differ-
ent concerns relating to earnings and liquidity.
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d.Regulatory Guidelines.
There are certain regulatory guidelines with which the workout specialist should be
familiar in this area. The Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular No. 181 (Revised
August 2, 1981 and 1984) sets forth certain informational guidelines in relation to which
the lead lender should supply information to the participant including (i) accrual status,
(ii) status of principal and interest payments' (iii) financial statements, collateral values
and lien status, and (iv) factual information in relation to the borrower's credit standing.
If these guidelines have been followed by the lead lender, it will be a better position when
the loan becomes troubled.
If a loan was classified during the last examination, is in a non-accrual status, is in
default as to principal or interest or has been renegotiated or compromised due to the weak-
ening financial condition of the borrower, the loan is a'low quality' loan, and the purchase or
sale of the loan may be considered to be unsafe and unsound. Care should be taken not to
participate or syndicate a loan that has any of these characteristics without full disclosure.
Loan repurchase arrangements will require the lead lender to include the amount
for which the lead lender is obligated to repurchase as a part of the lead lender's portion of
the loan for loan limit purposes. Any obligation to repurchase (whether written or oral)
will be treated as an extension of credit to the lead lender by the participant, and must be
documented in writing and so reflected on the books an records of both creditors.
Arrangements which provide that the participant's interest will be funded and paid back
on a last in-first out basis require the participant's interest to be added to the lead lender's
portion of the loan for loan limit purposes.
The documentation between the creditors will not cover all of the issues that will
face the lead lender or agent in the context of a workout of a troubled multi-creditor loan.
Many of the issues which arise will require the creditors to resolve the practical business
problems and make decisions that are beyond the scope or even the contemplation of the
documents governing the rights and duties of the parties. The lead lender or agent must
ensure that the decision-making process goes forward and that decisions are made by the
requisite number of creditors (as provided in the documentation) in a timely manner.
Often this will require great patience and negotiating ability.
2. Bank as a participant.
There are a number of concerns that the bank must be aware of when it is a partici-.
pant in a troubled loan. The first thing that the bank must determine is the legal relation-
ship between the bank and the creditor that sold the bank its interest. Depending upon
the documentation, the relationship between the lead lender and the participant may be :
(a) tenants in common, (b) trustee-beneficiary, (c) partners, (d) creditborrower, or (e)
principal-agent. Generally, if the bank (as a participant) has purchased a partial or frac-
tional interest in the loan, the bank will own the right to the bank's proportionate share of
future payments of principal and interest. The insolvency of the lead lender should not
affect the bank to the lead lender which is unsecured (most participations that are not sales
are unsecured or, at least, the security interest is unperfected), the effect of the insolvency
of the lead lender may be fatal to the bank's recovery.
With respect to a syndicated multi-creditor loan, if the bank holds its own note and is
a party to each security agreement it should be well protected in the case of the lead
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lender's insolvency as the insolvent lead lender should have no legal interest in the bank's
portion of the loan. The agent agreement or the intercreditor agreement should deal with
the administration of the loan in the event of the agent's insolvency or the insolvency of
one of the creditors;.
If the bank is a party to a participant agreement, the provisions of which indicate that
the arrangement is a sale, the position of the bank should be fairly safe. There are certain
risks of which the bank should be aware, however, and which it should attempt to protect
against, including commingling the funds, (b) the note should either indicate the interest
of the bank on its face or a third party should hold the note to avoid the risk of the lead
lender transferring the note to a holder in due course, and (c) the participation agreement
should be amended, if necessary, to allow continued administration of the loan in the
event of the insolvency of the lead lender. If the bank is a party to a participation agree-
ment that characterizes the arrangement as a loan by the bank to the lead lender, then the
bank should seek to accomplish one of the following, if at all possible: (a) an amendment
of the participation agreement to recharacterize the loan as a sale, or (b) assurance that the
participation agreement contains an enforceable security agreement and perfection of the
security interest, if possible, under applicable law. If these steps cannot be accomplished,
careful negotiation with the lead lender that leads to a reworking of the interecreditor rela-
tionship will be necessary.
IX. Remedial Action by Banks.
A. INITIAL ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION.
1. Overview.
It is common for a troubled credit relationship to be transferred to the workout officer
in a state of disarray. The workout officer is often faced with disorganized files, a fearful
borrower/guarantor and no clear direction. The first step, then, in rehabilitating the rela-
tionship is to determine what the bank has in terms of collateral and outside sources of
repayment and what the problems are. Clear understanding of the facts is an absolute
necessity, for a clear and comprehensive understanding of the facts will dictate the plan of
action. The workout officer should make no assumptions about the credit nor should he
rely completely upon his predecessor's version of the facts. He must make his own com-
plete investigation of the situation. Otherwise, he may develop a workout plan that blows
up because it was predicated on unreliable information and incorrect assumptions.
The correct procedure for investigation revolves around creation of proper files which
accurately reflect the credit relationship. In order to create proper files, the workout officer
must necessarily
" gather all information from all sources in the bank and outside the bank including
all existing credit files, working files, desk files and so forth,
" order or otherwise obtain unbiased information about the collateral and the feasi-
bility of its providing all or part of debt service and ultimate repayment,
" organize this disparate information chronologically within subject matter (i.e., col-
lateral, outside ability to pay),
" eliminate duplicates and organize notes on, scraps of paper,
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* analyze the facts the file reflects as it is organized, and
* synthesize the facts into a plan.
Information and analysis obtained or performed by the workout officer which is sub-
ject to attorney-client privilege should be segregated.90 If the workout officer has any
doubts or concerns with respect to the nature of the information in the file, its sensitivity
in the event of litigation or the applicability of the attorney-client privilege, the bank's
counsel should be consulted for advice.
90. The attorney/client privilege generally refers to the client's privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent other parties from disclosing confidential communications which are made to facili-
tate the rendition of professional legal services. Communications between the client or the
client's representative and the lawyer or the lawyer's representative which are confidential are
protected. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (if is necessary that the com-
munication be confidential). Confidentiality requires an intention that the communication
not be communicated to third parties. See Dorothy K. Winston 6- Co. v. Town Heights
Development, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1214 (D.C. Dist. 1974) (the communication must be intended
to be confidential). In some states the attorney/client privilege is given a strict construction
because of its tendency to suppress the truth, see eg., San Francisco v. Superior Court of San
Francisco, 37 Cal. 2d 227, rehearing denied, 231 P.2d 26 (1951) (because of its tendency to sup-
press the truth, attorney/client privilege receives a strict construction), while in other states a
more liberal construction is adopted on the theory that a client should be free to discuss all
circumstances of a matter with his attorney without fear that his statements will later be used
against him. See, e.g., People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y 453, 126 N.E. 2d 559 (1955) (court favored a
liberal construction on the theory that one consulting a lawyer should be encouraged to com-
municate all the facts without fear that his statements may possibly be used against him in the
future). The privilege belongs to the client, see Radiant Burners, Inc v. American Gas Ass'n.,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963), and only the client may waive
its right to the privilege, see Baird v. Koerner, 279 E2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (attorney cannot
divulge information that was communicated to him in confidence until the protection afford-
ed by the privilege has been properly waived by the client). In order to insure protection of
the confidentiality of the relationship between the attorney and client, policies should be
adopted which limit the scope of the parties, to whom information is disseminated and who
are in attendance at meetings. The attorney work product protects, from the discovery
process, the work produced and developed by an attorney, for his client, in anticipation of liti-
gation. The "work product" of an attorney in preparing for litigation includes the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories of the attorney or other representative
of a party to the litigation, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), and is reflected in such things as memo-
randa, statements, correspondence, interviews and briefs. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495(1947). The work product doctrine encourages effective preparation for litigation consistent
with the adversarial system, based on the theory that each side should prepare its case inde-
pendently without unnecessary interference. Id. Particular litigation need not have actually
been commenced in order for the doctrine to apply, but there must be some probability that
particular litigation will occur. See Diversified Industries, Inc v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th
Cir. 1977) en banc (1978). The degree to which specific litigation must be contemplated, and
the question of whether the work product doctrine protects documents which were generated
other than in the case in which discovery is sought, varies from state to state.
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File gathering, organization, culling and written analysis has the important side benefit
of demonstrating to internal and external reviewers that workout officer has complete
understanding of the credit relationship and a plan to rehabilitate or collect the loan or to
realize on the collateral.
2. Credit file.
Analysis of a troubled credit relationship is divided into two parts:
a. the borrower's or guarantors capacity to service and amortize his debt from sources
outside the asset(s) financed including the availability of additional collateral or
financial support, and
b. the assets' susceptibility to providing repayment of debt through sale or refinancing.
A properly constructed credit file will contain the information and analysis necessary
to determine borrower/guarantor capacity to pay.
The credit file must first be organized by subdividing it into appropriate sections,
eliminating duplicate information, identifying and finding missing information and filing
each section in chronological order.
As various components of the file are built, the workout officer should study and make
reading notes from analytical memos, correspondence, borrower/guarantor financial state-
ments and cash flow with focus on the borrower/guarantors:
" sources of cash,
" required and optional uses of cash,
" unpledged liquid assets such as tradable securities,
" debt to other lenders and their collateral,
" unpledged liquidable assets such as seasoned income producing property, and
" unpledged cash flowing assets such as seasoned notes receivable, available second
liens on cash flowing property or, much less desirable, interests in cash flowing part-
nerships.
Outdated or extraneous information should be noted and properly filed, but no time
should be spent on in depth analysis.
Careful study and complete reading notes will facilitate analysis of the borrower/guar-
antor capacity to service the existing loan or any form of restructured loan.
3. Project Files.
The second part of analysis of a troubled credit relationship comes from gaining thor-
ough understanding and knowledge of the assets pledged. This is accomplished through
collection, organization and analysis of material necessary to build a project file for each
collateral asset.
The workout officer should gather from every source in the bank all information relat-
ing to each collateral asset including:
• the original loan underwriting memo,
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* draw requests and certifications,
• appraisals and feasibility studies, if any, made in connection with initial underwriting,
* all subsequent appraisals and feasibility studies,
* inspection reports,
* all contracts and closing statements in connection with prior partial releases of for
sale properties such as buildings, lots or homes,
* rent rolls on income producing collateral,
* all leases and lease summaries on income producing collateral,
* year to date and current month operating statements on income producing collateral,
* copies of service contracts such as janitoring, equipment, etc.,
* copies of all other third-party contracts, if any,
* all environmental studies and assessments, if any,
* all borrowing base reports and aging reports of accounts receivable,
" letters of credits,
" all correspondence to and from the borrower/guarantor(s) relating to the property,
and
" all internally generated memoranda describing the property.
The workout officer should request and receive the desk files of his bank predecessor
which files often contain items not found in official files. Any information listed above
which is not in the bank's possession should be requested of the borrower in writing.
Concurrently, the workout officer should order: (i) a title report to identify any
mechanic's or materialrnan's liens or other claims filed of record on the property; (ii) an ad
valorem tax certificate from all applicable taxing authorities; and (iii) a certificate of insur-
ance from the borrower if not already taxing authorities; and (iv) a UCC search in all
applicable jurisdictions with respect to any personal property collateral. Environmental
issues should be addressed at this point. The project file of each collateral asset should
then be organized in the format outlined in Procedures. Extraneous and duplicate infor-
mation should be discarded unless it contains an original signature.
Finally, the workout officer should order from a competent appraiser an updated
appraisal of the collateral based on current market conditions and the current status of the
collateral. The appraisal should be supplemented by a feasibility study which considers
current market conditions. The appraisal gives guidance in determining correct account-
ing treatment of the loan. The feasibility study gives guidance in development of a plan of
restructure.
As the project file is being constructed, the workout officer should analyze appropriate
documents to give him knowledge of:
* status of completion,
current market for the product offered,
waste or mismanagement by the borrower,
* recent sales volume (for sale properties),
* recent leasing activity and current operating costs (income properties),
* current and near term identifiable cash flow produced by the property,
claims of others on the property, and
the value and salability of the property.
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Again, careful study and complete reading notes will facilitate analysis of the situation.
4. Legalfies.
The legal documentation of the loan should be in reasonably good order if closed by the
bank's own legal staff or outside counsel. Any missing documentation such as recorded
deeds of trust, mortgages, UCC financial statements, paid tax receipts or insurance certifi-
cates should be obtained by collateral cage personnel under the workout officer's oversight
The legal documentation of loans not closed by the bank's attorneys may be incom-
plete. In such case, collateral cage personnel with the assistance of a paralegal (if neces-
sary) should gather all missing documents, cure filing defects and organize the file.
The workout officer should carefilly review the note, guaranties and loan agreement
for business points to determine, for example, whether the guaranties are of payment and
performance or only of collection, whether the guaranties are limited in any way, whether
the construction loan agreement contains a provision requiring a borrower's deposit in
certain circumstances and whether all loans are cross collateralized or cross defaulted.
These and other points will become important leverage either to the bank or to the bor-
rower in negotiations. The workout officer must know whether he is dealing from
strength or weakness. Typical business deficiencies in loan documents include:
" No cross default or cross collateralization;
" No right to approve leases;
" No borrower deposit requirement;
" No time limit on right to cure defaults;
" No penalty interest provision;
" Limitations on exercise of certain remedies;
" Inadequate insurance provisions;
" Inadequate restrictions on sale of personal property; and
" No lock box provisions relating to receivables.
Legal sufficiency of the loan documents should be reviewed by the bank's counsel.
After review, counsel should report any significant deficiencies to the workout officer along
with required remedial action and a cost estimate therefor.
Loan participations purchased present additional complexity. Often, the lead lender
has virtually unlimited decision making powers in a workout effectively foreclosing the
banks legal right to participate meaningfully in negotiations with the debtor. The partici-
pation agreement may contain a buysell provision under which the bank could take out
the lead lender or force being taken out itself, invariably at a loss. However, being taken
out at a loss may be less costly than being an unwilling participant in oafish negotiations
by an unskilled, or worse, financially weak lead lender. Also,the lead lender may be con-
strained in debtor negotiations by its obligations to the other participant(s).
Legal leverage and significant documentation deficiencies should be identified and
analyzed with the assistance of the bank's counsel.
5. Physical inspection.
Collateral assets should be personally inspected by the workout officer promptly upon
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his receipt of the case. The extent and nature of the physical inspection should be made
only in accordance with the rights of the bank under the loan documents and applicable
law. During inspection, particular attention should be paid to design, quality, mainte-
nance, location, access, traffic, neighborhood ambiance, evidence of competition such as
"for lease" and "for sale" signs on surrounding properties and so forth. The workout offi-
cer should approach the collateral asset with the view of a tenant or buyer as the case may
be. What about the property would encourage or discourage its lease or sale?
During inspection, the workout officer should be alert for signs of obvious construc-
tion defects, deferred maintenance or environmental hazards. If he suspects any, profes-
sional engineers should be engaged to make a thorough investigation and written report
immediately.
6. Environmental issues.
Case law under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act ('CERCLA) 9 1 and comparable state statutes is developing toward the per-
ceived deep pockets of lenders. For example, in U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp.,92 the l1th
Circuit Court of Appeals found that a secured lender may incur liability under CERCLA
merely by participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree which would
indicate that it had the capacity to influence the borrower's treatment and disposal of haz-
ardous waste.
Thus, it is incumbent on the workout officer to become thoroughly knowledgeable of
environmental procedures and pitfalls and to be aware of circumstances which could
expose the bank to unlimited claims under environmental laws.
7. Special issues in construction loans.
It is often in the bank's best interest to retain the debtor's interest and cooperation at
least through completion of construction since, if he is honest he can usually complete the
project faster and cheaper. If the bank has lost confidence or the debtor has given up, the
following issues must be addressed if the bank intends to complete the project.
* Contractor and subcontractor status.
Legal access to plans and specifications in absence of debtor.
* Subcontractor liens and lien waivers.
* Defenses to mechanics liens.
* New permits in name of bank.
* Cost of construction delays.
* Feasibility of restriction of project scope.
* Preservation of payment and performance bonds.
B. THE DECISION: WORKOUT OR FORECLOSURE?
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 Supp. IV 1992).
92. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
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X. Concluding Observations.
This paper explores the circumstances facing debtors and creditors in America in the
grip of a national crisis of capital inadequacy. Although America had faced a relatively
recent banking crisis in the mid- 1970's, it paled in comparison to the recent distress. Loan
underwriting became irrelevant. The absolute loss in value of many assets which served as
collateral for bank loans was systemic and unavoidable by the debtors and creditors. This
systemic loss is distinguished from the "systemic" banking crises alluded to by many com-
mentators as the risk of one bank's failure to the solvency of other banks in the banking
system. Although the systemic crisis of capital adequacy in America did, in fact, pose
bank-to-bank system risks, the issues presented were far more fundamental to overall
American financial stability and bank solvency.
The American systemic crisis of capital adequacy was manifest where capital reposes,
in assets; assets which collateralize loans, and which comprise the asset side of a banks' bal-
ance sheet, and which are the source of a bank's solvency and liquidity. Although the
American crisis has been characterized as the consequence of regulatory and supervisory
failure and management abuse, while true in part, such a characterization obscures and
begs the more fundamental questions regarding the source of the systemic problem and
encourages a localized "micro" response from government regulators, supervisors, examin-
ers and bank managers.
This paper focuses on the "micro" manifestations to the problem, and outlines a small
part of the context of the problem in America. Debtors and creditors as well as regulators
in other jurisdictions such as Mexico, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and even
Japan, who continue to categorize their banking and credit "problem" as local and explain-
able by focusing blame and recrimination on obvious participants in an echo of the early
foundations of insolvency law, must accept that the problems are not limited to America.
The world wide systemic problem of capital adequacy and bank insolvency is not, fun-
damentally, a problem of bank mismanagement, fraud or crime, but represents a broad-
based world-wide systemic problem of capital adequacy, whose roots predate the recent
American crisis, and which has spread throughout both so-called "developed economies"
as well as emerging and transitional economies. As international pressure for "transparen-
cy" in financial information disclosures as well as consistency and clarity in accounting
rules and laws relating to banking, credit and security creation and enforcement increase,
borrowers, bankers, accountants and lawyers in emerging economies will find the princi-
ples and strategies presented in this paper to be of increasing relevance and importance.
Attention to the principles, practical issues and strategies presented in this paper will be of
benefit to debtors and creditors in other jurisdictions who now face the consequences of
the global crisis of capital inadequacy.
